the new russian nationalismand minority ethnic grievances domestically. In order for these
effects to last, however, such expansion would have to be long-
term, piecemeal and cumulative. With these opinion trends – as
well as the understanding that patriotic opinion rallies may not
be durable – the Kremlin gets an added motivation to carry
out expansionist policies in the former Soviet Union, so as to
boost the longevity of Putin’s rule – indeed, well beyond 2024, if
desired. If Russia’s ethnic minorities turn into a ‘fifth column’ it is
more likely to be one helping Putin build up a USSR 2.0, not one
aimed at subverting his expansionist designs.
Russia’s expansion into Crimea in 2014 is a telling case, a dem-
onstration par excellence of the logic of dynamic state identity.
It relates to all three options for Russia’s state identity change.
First, it could be supported as ethnic consolidation. The Crimean
population is predominantly ethnic Russian – about 59 per cent in
2001 self- identified as ethnic Russians and 77 per cent as predom-
inantly Russian- language speakers. This would arguably resonate
with the sense of ethnic group dominance among Russia’s ethnic
Russians (80.6 per cent in 2010)^19 and support perceptions that
the annexation of Crimea sustains the group position of ethnic
Russians while increasing the territory and population of their
state – a clear gain.
Second, the annexation of Crimea could be viewed as a step
toward a Slavic Union and receive particularly strong support
among Russia’s ethnic non- Russian Slavs. This perception could
draw on the interaction of ethnic and institutional dimensions
of group identity. Ethnically, the Crimean population in 2001
was 24.4 per cent Ukrainian and 1.5 per cent Belorussian – a
significantly larger non- Russian Slav share than in the Russian
Federation. This Ukrainian ethnic identity was reinforced institu-
tionally, with Crimea being part of the Soviet republic of Ukraine
since 1954 and of independent Ukraine since 1991. This means
that Russia’s ethnic Ukrainians could regard the inclusion of
Crimea’s Ukrainians as boosting not only their numbers but their
institutional leverage as well.
Third, the annexation of Crimea may be viewed as a long- term
process leading toward USSR 2.0. Typical secondary- school
history education in Russia since the Soviet period has presented