changes in russian nationalist public opinion 2013–14becoming more prominent during 2013 and 2014, one would
expect significant shifts in support among the Russian public
for various ‘institutionalized forms of [nationalist] inclusion and
exclusion’ (Wimmer 2002: 9) – that is, attitudes as to which
groups to include or exclude from the nation or the state. Indeed,
there is a significant literature that argues state leaders often
anticipate such upswells of nationalist and patriotic sentiment
and sometimes even launch wars precisely in order to generate
‘rally- around- the- flag’ effects that can squelch dissent and boost
support for a leadership whose popularity is flagging (see Levy
1989).
In this chapter, we analyse findings from two nationally rep-
resentative surveys, one conducted in May 2013 and the other
in November 2014, designed to investigate the extent to which
these unexpected and earth- shaking events altered how Russian
citizens think about themselves in terms of ethnicity, nation and
state. Some findings are striking and corroborate theory- based
expectations: well over four- fifths of those surveyed welcomed
the incorporation of Crimea into Russia, and support for Russian
President Vladimir Putin surged half again. Other parts of the
story, however, would indicate that further nuancing is required
in the kind of change we attribute to the wild events of 2014.
As regards many kinds of nationalist thinking, the increase was
actually rather slight; and some aspects of Russian national-
ism, including support for further territorial expansion, actually
declined after Crimea was annexed. Moreover, we also discern
strong indications that the ‘rally- around- the- leader’ effect may
not be long- lived. Members of the public have remained deeply
concerned about economic problems that have only grown worse
since the crisis, as well as about other problems that the wave of
patriotism has not actually resolved. The crisis, then, seems to
have successfully diverted attention from these other problems
without effecting the kind of social transformation that could
benefit the regime in the longer run. What we find appears to be
much more a contingent ‘rally- around- the- leader’ effect than a
potentially enduring ‘rally- around- the- flag’ effect.