changes in russian nationalist public opinion 2013–14one of scant increase in such nationalist sentiments in connection
with the 2014 events – but such sentiment was already quite high
to begin with and had long been so.
Attitudes also remained largely unchanged from 2013 to
2014 when respondents were asked if they supported granting
all migrants unconditional permanent residency rights (admit-
ting them all to Russia) or if they were in favour of having all
migrants deported – legal and illegal and their children – from
Russia. Given that most respondents see migrants as represent-
ing non- Russian ethnic groups, these questions de facto measure
public support for ethnic inclusion and exclusion. About 23 per
cent of the respondents fully supported wholesale deportation of
migrants in 2013, and 24 per cent did so in 2014. The share of
those who ‘agreed somewhat’ with deportation rose from 24 to 27
per cent. Once again, these slight increases, separately or in sum,
are statistically insignificant. It is possible that they were part of a
more substantial, slow- moving long- term trend. In 2005, depor-
tation was supported fully by 22.5 per cent of respondents and
partially by 21 per cent. Thus, total support for deportation rose
from 43.5 per cent in 2005 to about 51 per cent in 2014, which
is unlikely to be due to sampling error alone. However, if this is
the case, we may well be dealing with an enduring trend and not
a sharp fluctuation resulting predominantly from the nationalist-
patriotic mobilisation over developments in Ukraine. Views on
inclusion show a near- identical pattern. No significant change
was observed from 2013 to 2014. When asked about admitting
all migrants as Russian residents, about 9 per cent of respondents
agreed fully and 22 per cent agreed somewhat in 2013, whereas
7 per cent agreed fully and 23 per cent agreed somewhat in 2014.
Anti- migrant nationalism was already very high to begin with and
did not experience a particularly noteworthy surge in 2014. Thus
while the Levada Centre found that tolerance of migrants actually
increased somewhat as part of a general euphoria immediately
following the Crimean annexation (Polit.ru 2014), our study
indicates this was at most temporary, and was neither substantial
nor robust.
Moreover, the stability we observe did not reflect only those
questions on which hard- line sentiments dominated Russian