The New Russian Nationalism Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism

the new russian nationalism

2014. The proportion of those who fully agreed with this proposi-
      tion increased by fewer percentage points – from about 28 to 30
      per cent. These changes are well within the combined margin of
      the sampling error of the two surveys.
      The relative stability of perceptions of Islam as a social and
      cultural threat appears consistent with the relative stability of
      support for excluding the Muslim North Caucasus republics from
      the Russian Federation. The fact that support for Russia’s ter-
      ritorial expansion dropped significantly after the annexation of
      Crimea while support for excluding the Muslim regions of the
      North Caucasus from Russia stayed the same indicates that the
      latter may hinge more on views of Islam as a threat.

Economic worries

While our findings overall would indicate less of a surge in Russian
nationalism than a classic ‘rally- around- the- leader’ effect in Russian
public opinion from May 2013 to November 2014, the NEORUSS
surveys also support arguments that the rallying may be difficult to
sustain (see Balzer 2014). This is most clearly evident in the realm
of the economy. In May 2013, 19 per cent of Russians surveyed

2014

2013

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Same as at present

W/t North Caucasus

Slavic Union

USSR

Don’t know

Refuse to answer

Figure 7.6 Preferences for the territorial boundaries of the Russian
Federation