how nationalism and machine politics mix in russiaexpect to be most likely to win, and their joining that contender
in fact makes him or her more likely to win. This is, at root, a
giant game of coordination, where the networks try to figure out
which potential president the other major networks are likely to
support and to make their choice accordingly. Of course, they
may like some potential chief patrons more than others, but they
want even more not to wind up on a losing side of the struggle,
which could cost them power, resources and possibly even their
existences if the winner proves hostile or wants to settle scores
with prior opponents.
So what determines how the newly uncoordinated networks are
likely to decide on who is likely to win? One thing that matters is
the political machinery that each network wields. Networks that
control the most resources are likely to be seen as favourites in
the struggle, thereby attracting other networks and gaining more
resources. But when a dominant presidential machine is disinte-
grating, the relative strength of the various networks within it is
often unclear, and machine strength can dissipate rapidly if a net-
work’s allies or even members start to think it is unlikely to win.
Thus another factor is more important to the story being told
in this chapter: when the winner of the succession struggle must
consummate this victory by producing an official vote count in
his or her favour against at least some sort of opposition on the
ballot (even if this vote count does not have to be honest in any
way), public opinion comes to play a crucial role in determin-
ing who elites see as most likely to win. This is true for several
reasons. For one thing, it takes more effort and resources to falsify
votes against a more popular rival, so the candidate that does
need to organise less falsification has an advantage. In addition,
if an official vote count turns out to be blatantly against what
is widely believed to be prevailing public opinion, it becomes
easier for the loser to rally supporters to the streets, making for
larger and more threatening protests. Accordingly, suppressing
the uprising becomes more costly for the falsifier the more com-
mitted the protesters are, and potentially so costly that troops
may start to refuse to obey orders to carry it out. Popular support,
in other words, is an important resource that can be wielded by
patronalistic networks in battle. And this means that potential