the new russian nationalismis not so clear. Sometimes russkii can include other ethnic groups,
too, and the exact meaning of rossiiskii is even more ambiguous,
with the state long doing much actually to promote this ambigu-
ity (Shevel 2011). In any case, while the terms russkii and rossi-
iskii do not cleanly demarcate them, one can speak of two broad
strains of Russian nationalism that may be called ‘ethnic Russian
nationalism’ and ‘imperial Russian nationalism’.
For the sake of clarity, these concepts of nationalism should be
distinguished from actions that may be carried out in the name of
the nation but that are not actually aimed at increasing congru-
ence between state and nation. For example, making the nation
more powerful for its own sake is better captured by a term like
‘patriotism’. ‘Nationalism’ would, however, include strategies
aimed at defending the state from threats to the nation’s control
over the state.
The following subsections assess the degree to which national-
ism has played an important role in Putin’s gaining and remaining
in power as well as in his management of the political machine
more generally.
Nationalism and Putin’s rise to power and popularity
Putin’s rise to power in 1999–2000 resulted directly from his
popular support, although nationalism as defined here was only
a minor part of this appeal. Given the Kremlin’s strength in
2014, it is easy to forget that as late as August 1999, opposition
forces were the odds- on favourites to win the presidency in the
2000 election. The popular support for incumbent President Boris
Eltsin, after virtual economic collapse and a disastrous war in
Chechnya, was abysmally low. When in early August 1999 Eltsin
appointed the little- known FSB chief Vladimir Putin his prime
minister and declared him his handpicked political heir, many
considered this a kiss of political death. Indeed, polls showed
Putin with only 2 per cent support in the presidential race, far
behind the leaders. The big money, both figuratively and literally,
was on former Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov, who had guided
Russia through the acute financial crisis of 1998, had stood
strongly for Russian interests earlier as foreign minister and gen-