how nationalism and machine politics mix in russiaerally had impeccable patriotic credentials, including his own ties
to intelligence agencies. Primakov, moreover, had recently struck
a coalitional deal with the powerful mayor of Moscow to form a
large coalition of oligarchs and regional and political machines.
Indeed, with Eltsin approaching the end of his constitutionally
final term in office and so ill he was reported to be able to work
only a few hours a day at times and being frequently absent from
the Kremlin, Russia’s major networks saw him as a classic lame
duck. Looking to wind up on the side of the most likely winner,
major oligarchs like Vladimir Gusinskii and regional machines
like those in Tatarstan, Moscow and St Petersburg sooner or later
abandoned their earlier support for Eltsin and now placed their
bets on Primakov (Shvetsova 2003). Primakov came to head what
was then dubbed the Fatherland–All Russia bloc, which in turn
was harshly critical of the incumbent team and whose leaders
sounded many nationalist themes (Hale 2006).
What turned the tide in favour of Putin was a dramatic shift
in public opinion that resulted after a major tragedy that befell
Russia in September 1999: Terrorist bombs were detonated in
two large, ordinary apartment buildings in Moscow, and together
with attacks in other cities, some 300 innocents were killed. Putin
was quick to blame rebels in Chechnya, launching a massive mili-
tary operation that effectively levelled the republic’s capital city
and killed thousands. Putin’s ratings in public opinion soared,
from just 4 per cent in the presidential race in reliable September
polls to over 50 per cent in December. Seeing that Putin would
clearly win even a completely free and fair vote for president,
most oligarchs and regional political machines now shifted over
to Putin, with even some who had been in Fatherland–All Russia
now attempting to make amends and get into his good graces.
Eltsin capitalised on the situation by resigning early, which
resulted in Putin’s becoming acting president and forced early
elections, in March 2000 (Hale 2006).
Some have interpreted this as Putin’s riding a wave of nation-
alism to power, but the bulk of the evidence suggests it was not
mainly nationalism that appealed to people in Putin. For one thing,
nationalism does not explain why people would have preferred
Putin to Primakov, who had a strong reputation for defending