the new russian nationalismBased on a reading of Putin’s programmatic speeches on national
identity, I argue that traditional ethno- political correctness, asso-
ciated with a civic, multi- ethnic and multi- confessional identity,
has been increasingly challenged by a shift in focus towards the
traditional ethno- cultural core of this identity: its ‘Russianness’
(russkost’). That said, I find that the Kremlin clearly stops short
of pursuing clear- cut ethnonationalism. Instead, to maximise its
room for manoeuvre, the Kremlin has been deliberately blurring
the borders of the Russian ethnic ‘self’, making it possible to re-
interpret this ‘self’ as something more narrow but also broader
than the body of citizens of the Russian Federation. Internally,
such an identity holds the potential to encompass most of the
population; externally, it can build up under the Kremlin’s self-
appointed role of speaking – and acting – on behalf of not only
the ethnic Russians in the Diaspora, but of a wider ‘Russian
world’ (russkii mir) as well.^1
After a brief backdrop presenting Putin’s take on national iden-
tity and the ‘Russian idea’ during his first two terms as Russian
president (2000–8), this chapter examines Putin’s key addresses
on the national question during the first two years of his third
term, culminating with the March 2014 speech on the occasion of
the official accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Federation.
Across these speeches, I argue, Putin redefined the national ‘self’
from a predominantly civic understanding based on citizenship
and identification with the state, to a more ethnic one focused on
Russian language and culture, one in which the ethnic Russians
take centre stage. I then trace how this new understanding of
the national ‘self’ was translated into federal policy through
the adoption of a new ‘State Strategy on Nationalities Policy
for the Period through 2025’, and discuss what response this
Russian- centred approach has received in the population at large.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of whether Putin’s new
‘ethnic turn’ may have better prospects for taking firm root than
the civic rossiiane identity the Kremlin sought to promote in the
1990s.