the ethnification of russian nationalism
or as a territorial area that could be developed into such an entity
- he called ‘nation- builders’.
Today, a quarter- century after Szporluk wrote his article, the
USSR has ended up in the dustbin of history and a new genera-
tion of Russians have grown up who have never known any other
‘homeland’ than the Russian Federation. This is not to say that
the ‘empire- savers’ have evaporated. They are still around, now in
the guise of various kinds of ‘empire- nostalgics’ or ‘Eurasianists’.
Some celebrate the fact that the Soviet Union was a multinational
state (quadrant 1), while others combine a desire for a large and
strong state with Russian supremacism (quadrant 2).
On both axes intermediate positions can be found. With regard
to territory, it is not uncommon to hear among contemporary
Russian ethnonationalists that, while the Soviet Union is irredeem-
ably lost and should not be resurrected, the two Slavic republics
of Ukraine and Belarus, plus perhaps the Russian- populated part
of Kazakhstan, ought to be incorporated into a Russian nation-
state. The main motivation here is ethnic commonality among the
Eastern Slavs rather than any harking for a big and strong state.
As Oxana Shevel has pointed out (2011: 187–9), some Russian
ethnonationalists include also the Ukrainians and the Belarusians
among those whom they regard as ‘Russians’ alongside the Great
Russians, or ‘Russians proper’.
In this chapter I trace the historical trajectory of Russian
nationalism, arguing that a clearly discernible movement has
Territorial orientation
Primarily statist
A
Primarily ethnic
B
I ‘Empire’ oriented
1
empire-saving
nationalism
2
supremacist
nationalism
II ‘Core’ oriented
3
Russian
Federation
nationalism
4
ethnic core
nationalism
Figure 1.1 A typology of Russian nationalisms