the new russian nationalismbetween these two groups has reached a level of ‘open hatred’ and
‘a war of extinction’.
In this fierce ideological battle the ethnonationalists can note
several defections from the impertsy camp to theirs. Sergeev
confesses that he himself had been deluded by Eurasianist ideas,
before converting to ethnonationalism. Remarkable is the change
of heart among some former leaders of the National Salvation
Front. For instance, Ilia Konstantinov, identified by Vera Tolz
(1998: 272) as the mastermind behind the establishment of the
Front, now sympathises with the ethnonationalists. Konstantinov
remains a member of one of the smaller empire- saving parties
but that is primarily for the sake of old friendships.^8 Also Viktor
Alksnis, a former leader of both Soiuz and the National Salvation
Front, has shifted sides. In an article tellingly entitled ‘Farewell
Empire! (At the dawn of a Russian Russia)’ Alksnis admits: ‘I
have always been and will remain a person with an imperial
mind- set and to me it has been painful to accept that my Great
Empire Idea has died’. However, one must adapt to new realities,
he writes: ‘In Russia’s transition from empire to nation- state...
We must take into account the national interests of the state-
bearing nation – the Russians’ (Alksnis 2007: 42, 46). Thus,
while in the 1990s the ranks of the National Salvation Front
featured former ‘culturalists’ like Igor Shafarevich and Valentin
Rasputin, now the tide seemed to have shifted in the opposite
direction.
The threat against a genuine Russian nation- state, as the new
ethnonationalists see it, does not emanate from the side of the
impertsy only. They are fighting on two fronts, the other being the
battle to dispel the illusions of Tishkov’s civic nation- state model.
Kirill Benediktov claims that the most important task for Russian
nationalists today is to regain legitimacy for the concept russkii
and to fight back the term rossiiane (Russkii natsionalizm 2010:
6). Aleksandr Khramov (2013: 229) criticises Tishkov for believ-
ing that in nation- building ‘only the civic component is important
- as if all citizens of Russia automatically make up a civic nation.
In reality, without a common culture no self- identification as a
nation is possible’, Khramov insists. Sergeev (2010: 208) looks
forward to the day when Tishkovianism will take its place in the