( 228 ) Notes to pages 84–96
- F. James Davis, Who Is Black? One Nation’s Definition (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1991).
- Linda Martín Alcoff, “On Being Mixed,” ch. 12 in Alcoff, Visible Identities: Race, Gender,
and the Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
- Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar, eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives
on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
- Rawls, Theory of Justice.
- Hannelore Schröder, “Kant’s Patriarchal Order,” trans. Rita Gircour, in Robin May
Schott, ed., Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1997).
- Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 8– 9.
- Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, with a new foreword (New York: Basic Books,
2013; orig. ed. 1974), pp. 150– 53.
- Nozick, Anarchy, State, pp. 152– 53.
- See, for example, the cavalierly dismissive treatment of the issue in David Schmidtz,
“The Right to Distribute,” in Ralf M. Bader and John Meadowcroft, eds., The Cambridge
Companion to Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011).
- Nozick, Anarchy, State, p. 344n2.
- Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1997).
- In the decade since the original version of this chapter was published a growing body
of literature has emerged debating the relationship between ideal and non- ideal theory.
For some overviews, see, for example, Ingrid Robeyns and Adam Swift, eds., “Social
Justice: Ideal Theory, Nonideal Circumstances,” Special Issue, Social Theory and Practice
34, no. 3 ( July 2008); A. John Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 38, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 5– 36; Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non- Ideal
Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (September 2012): 654– 64.
CHAPTER 6
- The qualification is necessary because of a crucial point of disanalogy between race and
gender, that while there is just one female sex (at least in the West), there are several non-
white races, and their assigned statuses in racist hierarchies have not historically been the
same (as will be seen below for Kant). So while “sub- person” is a useful umbrella term, a
more detailed treatment would require additional internal divisions.
- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999;
orig. ed. 1971), p. 24.
- Allen W. Wood, General Introduction, Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed.,
Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. xvii.
- Emmanuel Eze, “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology,” in
Eze, ed., Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell,
1997); Robert Bernasconi, “Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant’s Role in the
Enlightenment Construction of Race,” in Bernasconi, ed., Race (Malden, MA: Blackwell,
2001); Robert Bernasconi, “Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” in Julie K. Ward and
Tommy L. Lott, eds., Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002).
- Quoted in Eze, “Color of Reason,” p. 118.
- Quoted in Eze, “Color of Reason,” p. 117.
- Quoted in Bernasconi, “Kant as an Unfamiliar Source,” pp. 147– 48.
- Quoted in Eze, “Color of Reason,” p. 117.
- Quoted in Eze, “Color of Reason,” p. 116.
- Quoted in Eze, “Color of Reason,” p. 122.
- Quoted in Bernasconi, “Kant as an Unfamiliar Source,” p. 158.
- Quoted in Eze, “Color of Reason,” p. 116.
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