( 234 ) Notes to pages 153–161
Nineteenth- Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999);
Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Andrew Valls, ed., Race and Racism
in Modern Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Thomas McCarthy,
Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2009); Hobson, Eurocentric Conception.
- Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000; orig. ed. 1983); Michael C.
Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African- American Political Ideologies
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Anthony Bogues, Black Heretics, Black
Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 2003); Tommie Shelby, We
Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2005).
- Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 8.
- Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 7.
- Rawls, Law of Peoples, pp. 89– 90.
- M. F. Ashley Montagu, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, 7th ed., abridged
for students (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1997; orig. ed. 1942).
- Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 8, 309. Neither here nor in any of his later books does Rawls
ever provide any discussion of what non- ideal “compensatory justice” (which I am taking
to be corrective justice) would require. Moreover, his detailed analysis of the appropriate
criteria and justification for civil disobedience and conscientious refusal (Theory of Justice,
§55– 59) presupposes throughout “the special case of a nearly just society, one that is well-
ordered for the most part but in which some serious violations of justice nevertheless do
occur” (Theory of Justice, p. 319). So even this discussion of one kind of non- ideal theory is
heavily idealized, and thus of little applicability to ill- ordered white-supremacist societies.
- Chief Justice John Roberts, quoted in “Justices, 5– 4, Limit Use of Race for School
Integration Plans,” New York Times, June 29, 2007, A1.
- But for an alternative approach (to be discussed in the next chapter), see Tommie Shelby,
“Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations,” Fordham Law Review 72, no. 5 (April
2004): 1697– 714.
- Jean- Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. and trans.
Victor Gourevitch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988);
Mills, The Racial Contract.
- Pateman and Mills, Contract and Domination, chs. 3, 4, and 8.
CHAPTER 9
- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999; orig. ed. 1971). I would like to thank the three anonymous referees of the origi-
nal journal version of this essay for their thoughtful and thorough engagement with my
argument. I made various changes in the original draft in response to their comments,
which undoubtedly turned it into a better essay than it would otherwise have been. In the
pertinent notes below, I explain why, though I took his criticisms seriously, I did not, after
reflecting on them, act on all the suggestions of one particular referee.
- Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2010). See, in particular, pp. 3– 7, on the significance for her of racial justice being
a matter of “nonideal theory.” She gives three reasons there for rejecting ideal theory and
Rawlsianism: (a) principles must be tailored “to the motivational and cognitive capaci-
ties of human beings”; (b) ideal theory, “founded on inadequate empirical assumptions,”
occludes crucial distinctions and the possibly new ideals that might be required by altered
conceptual maps; (c) ideal theory may be “epistemologically disabling,” for example,
because the representative cognitive positions of an ideal society will be raceless, thus
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