Notes to pages 176–182 ( 239 )
- Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 200– 201.
- Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 87, 90.
- Richard M. Valelly, The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith,
The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1999).
- Michael K. Brown et al., Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color- Blind Society
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
- Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic
Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 252, 287.
- Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 87.
- However, as noted at the start of the book, we might now (2016) be witnessing a welcome
shift the other way.
- See again Pateman and Mills, Contract and Domination, ch. 3.
- For an insightful essay on the role of ideology in such circumstances, see the work of one
Tommie Shelby, “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory,” Philosophical Forum 34,
no. 2 ( June 2003): 153– 88.
- Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, with a new foreword (New York: Basic Books,
2013; orig. ed. 1974).
- Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 152– 53, 344n2. For a valuable reconstruction
and development of a “Nozickian” theorization of racial corrective justice, see Andrew
Valls, “The Libertarian Case for Affirmative Action,” Social Theory and Practice 25, no. 2
(Summer 1999): 299– 323.
- Here I am, of course, presupposing an ideal liberalism. For the sordid history of actual
liberalism (in which racial injustice is liberal), see Domenico Losurdo’s recently translated
Liberalism: A Counter- History, trans. Gregory Elliott (New York: Verso, 2011).
- Taylor, “Rawlsian Affirmative Action,” p. 486.
- Insofar as FEO incorporates formal equality of opportunity, it does (implicitly) have an
anti- discrimination component. But this is intended by Rawls as a pre- emptive prohibition
under ideal conditions, not as a corrective measure justifying redistributive policies under
non- ideal conditions. The substantive core of FEO— which does justify redistribution—
is the correction of bad luck in the social lottery of an ideal society, not the redress of the
legacy of discrimination in a non- ideal society. And the rationale is the moral arbitrariness
of the social circumstances into which we are born, not the moral wrongness of social (here
racial) oppression.
- See my “Contract of Breach: Repairing the Racial Contract,” ch. 4 of Pateman and Mills,
Contract and Domination.
- It belatedly occurred to me when doing the final revision of this essay (the journal version)
that the question may, for a significant subset of variants, simply be undecidable. In other
words, Rawls provides so little guidance on how to derive non- ideal principles of correc-
tive justice from his ideal principles that for many candidates we will simply be unable to
judge whether they would count as legitimately Rawlsian or not— thereby fundamentally
putting into question (in yet another way) the justification for spending so many decades
on ideal theory in the first place.
CHAPTER 10
- Charles W. Mills, “Red Shift: Politically Embodied / Embodied Politics” (2002), rpt. in
Mills, Radical Theory, Caribbean Reality: Race, Class and Social Domination (Kingston,
Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2010).
- Leonard Harris, ed., Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro- American Philosophy
from 1917 (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/ Hunt 1983). However, there were at least two other
earlier collections, Charles A. Frye, ed., Level Three: A Black Philosophy Reader (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1980) and Percy Edward Johnston, ed., Afro American
