Are Women Human?
Wollstonecraft’s Defense of Rights for Women
RUTH ABBEY
Despite its title, Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of
Woman says relatively little about what actual rights women should be ac-
corded (Taylor 2003, 55; Frazer 2008, 251). Over the course of a few pages
toward the end of chapter nine, some hints do appear. These include fi nan-
cial independence and being able to run for political offi ce, along with the
opportunity to be educated as physicians and to study politics (176 –177).
Women should be allowed to “earn their own subsistence” (177) in fi elds
other than prostitution, education, and millinery. They must be granted “a
civil existence in the State, married or single” (178; see also 215).^1 But
here, where Wollstonecraft is at her most explicit about the opportunities
women should have, the language of rights is absent. Indeed, including its
title, the term “rights” appears only a little over thirty times in the text.^2 For
a tract ostensibly devoted to championing the proposal that women should
be rights bearers, this is curious.
This chapter proposes two explanations for this lacuna: one contextual,
the other theoretical. It probes the depths of Wollstonecraft’s thinking,
drilling down to the metaphysical foundation of her defense of rights. It
explores her swingeing critique of the legal, political, social, economic,
intellectual, and moral condition of women in societies like Britain and
France in her time. It also shows how her deeper views about metaphys-
ics and ontology inform her attack. This chapter then grapples with the
paradox of Wollstonecraft urging women’s rights while being scathingly
critical of most women (Taylor 2003, 5, 17). It concludes by making au-
dible some of the echoes of this pioneering defense of rights for women in
contemporary feminist debates.