90 The Debate over the Consequence Argument
p = The coin does not fall heads.q = The coin does not fall tails.p&q = The coin does not fall heads, and the coin does not fall tails.As applied to Jones, granting that he has no special powers to control coins when
tossed into the air, and granting that the coins are not “trick” coins, Jones has no
choice about whether the coin falls heads, Np. For the same reason, Jones has no
choice about whether the coin lands tails, Nq. But Jones does have a choice
about whether p&q is true. He does have a choice about the truth of this
conjunction:
p&q: The coin does not fall heads and the coin does not fall tails.All he has to do is toss it, and it will come up one or the other. As such, it is
false, for Jones, that N(p&q). And this is a counterexample to agglomerativity
for “has no choice about.” As a result, we have a proof that Rule β is not a valid
inference principle; it strictly implies agglomerativity for “has no choice about,”
and agglomerativity for “has no choice about” is invalid.
In response to these sorts of assaults on Rule β, various incompatibilists
wishing to defend the Consequence Argument have introduced principles that
can do Rule β’s work in the Consequence Argument, but are not subject to these
problems. For instance, a number of philosophers, such as David Widerker
(1987), Kadri Vihvelin (1988), and Alicia Finch and Ted Warfield (1998) have
advocated a principle of a stronger sort instead:
β-box: Np, □(p → q) ˫ NqAs it turns out, this principle is not vulnerable to McKay and Johnson’s criticism
of Rule β. In particular, β-box cannot be used to justify the final step of the proof
of agglomerativity. (This is a detail we will not explain here.)
4.6. Assessments
As we stated earlier, we think the main concerns for the Consequence Argument
are the selectivity problem that Slote sets out, and the challenges to the princi-
ples of the Fixity of the Past and the Fixity of the Laws that we have discussed.
Recall the example that we used earlier to bolster the compatibilist’s case.
Suppose that you have the ability to speak both English and French. You’re in a
café in Paris, but you order your coffee in English. Your friend says to you:
“You could have ordered in French instead!” It would seem that your companion
was correct to say what she did no matter what the truth about determinism turns
out to be. So it appears that any reasonable person should accept that there are
determinism- friendly senses of “could have done otherwise.” Perhaps Lewis’s