- Introduction Acknowledgments xiii
- 1 Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Determinism
- 1.1. Free Will
- 1.2. The Will in Free Will
- 1.3. Moral Responsibility
- 1.4. Determinism
- 1.5. Metaphysical, Physical, and Nomic Impossibility
- 1.6. Indeterminism, Mechanism, and Naturalism
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 2 The Free Will Problem
- 2.1. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism
- Determinism 2.2. Motivating the Problem: The Appeal of Free Will and
- 2.3. Free Will Problems
- 2.4. Situating Compatibilism and Incompatibilism
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 2.1. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism
- 3 Classical Compatibilism and Classical Incompatibilism
- 3.1. The Case for Classical Compatibilism
- Otherwise” 3.2. The Dispute over the Analysis of “Could Have Done
- 3.3. The Case for Classical Incompatibilism
- 3.4. Classical Incompatibilism and Agent Causation
- 3.5. Reflections on the Classical Debate
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 3.1. The Case for Classical Compatibilism
- 4 The Debate over the Consequence Argument viii Contents
- Do Otherwise 4.1. Reflecting on the Classical Controversy over the Ability to
- 4.2. A Formulation of the Consequence Argument
- 4.3. Strategies for Resisting the Consequence Argument
- 4.4. The Consequence Argument: A More Precise Formulation
- 4.5. Questioning Rule β and Seeking an Improved Version
- 4.6. Assessments
- Appendix I: What is a Modal Proposition?
- Semantics for Ability Appendix II: Ginet’s Challenge to Compatibilist- Friendly
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 5 Alternative Possibilities and Frankfurt Cases
- 5.1. Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Source Views
- 5.2. The Flicker of Freedom Defense
- 5.3. The Dilemma Defense
- 5.4. The Timing Defense
- 5.5. General Abilities to Do Otherwise
- 5.6. Final Words
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 6 Strawsonian Compatibilism
- 6.1. Strawson’s Audience: Optimists, Pessimists, and Skeptics
- 6.2. Strawson’s Assumptions about Moral Psychology
- 6.3. Strawson’s Theory of Moral Responsibility
- 6.4. Strawson’s Arguments for Compatibilism
- 6.5. Assessing Strawson’s Arguments for Compatibilism
- 6.6. Reflecting on Strawsonian Compatibilism
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 7 Three Source Incompatibilist Arguments
- 7.1. The Emergence of Source Theories
- 7.2. The Ultimacy Argument for Incompatibilism
- 7.3. The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism
- 7.4. The Manipulation Argument for Incompatibilism
- Incompatibilism 7.5. Closing Remarks on Arguments for Source
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 8 Contemporary Compatibilism: Seven Recent Views
- Compatibilists 8.1. The Dispute between Historical and Nonhistorical
- Blaming Practices 8.2. The Influences of Strawson on the Justification of our
- 8.3. The Proliferation of Senses of Moral Responsibility Contents ix
- 8.4. Dennett’s Multiple- Viewpoints Compatibilism
- View 8.5. Wolf ’s Reason View and Nelkin’s Rational Abilities
- 8.6. Mele’s Action- Theory Theory
- 8.7. Scanlon’s Contractualist Compatibilism
- 8.8. Wallace’s Fairness- Based Compatibilism
- 8.9. Russell’s Strawsonian- Inspired Critical Compatibilism
- 8.10. Bok’s Practical- Standpoint Compatibilism
- Approaches 8.11. A Continuum Ranging from Normative to Metaphysical
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- Reasons- Responsive Theories, and Leeway Theories 9 Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories,
- 9.1. Mesh Theories: An Initial Characterization
- 9.2. Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Mesh Theory
- 9.3. Three Challenges to Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Theory
- 9.4. Watson’s Structural Mesh Theory
- 9.5. Bratman’s Planning Theory
- Characterization 9.6. Reasons- Responsive Theories: An Initial
- 9.7. Fischer and Ravizza’s Reasons- Responsive Theory
- 9.8. Three Challenges to Fischer and Ravizza’s Theory
- Reasons- Responsive Source Theories 9.9. McKenna’s and Sartorio’s Agent- Based
- 9.10. Contemporary Leeway Theories
- 9.11. Vihvelin’s New Dispositionalism
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 10 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism
- 10.1. Three Kinds of Libertarianism
- 10.2. Two Event- Causal Libertarian Accounts
- 10.3. Luck Objections to Event- Causal Libertarianism
- 10.4. Applying the Objections
- 10.5. Adding in Higher- Order States
- 10.6. Agent- Causal Libertarianism
- 10.7. Agent- Causal Libertarianism and Luck Objections
- 10.8. Agent Causation and Rationality
- Agent- Causal Power 10.9. Contrastive Explanations and an Expanding
- Laws? 10.10. Is Agent- Causation Reconcilable with the Physical
- 10.11. Is Libertarian Agent Causation Required for Agency?
- 10.12. Non- Causal Theories
- 10.13. The Cost of Rejecting Libertarianism x Contents
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 11 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Skeptical Views
- 11.1. Spinoza, the First Hard Determinist
- 11.2. A Contemporary Hard Determinist
- 11.3. No- Free-Will- Either-Way Theories
- 11.4. A Neuroscientific Case against Free Will
- 11.5. Derk Pereboom’s Argument for Free Will Skepticism
- 11.6. Neil Levy’s Argument for Free Will Skepticism
- 11.7. Tamler Sommers’ Metaskepticism
- 11.8. Living without Free Will
- 11.9. Final Words
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- 12 Revisionism and Some Remaining Issues
- 12.1. Manuel Vargas’s Revisionism
- 12.2. Responsibility for Omissions
- 12.3. Deliberation and Free Will
- 12.4. Experimental Philosophy and Free Will
- 12.5. Religion and Free Will
- 12.6. Conclusion
- Suggestions for Further Reading
- Bibliography
- Index of authors cited
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