The Debate over the Consequence Argument 97into not raising her arm through means perfectly replicating what it would
be like for her simply to do so on her own volition (at a determined world).
In such a case, the nomic necessitation—that is, the causal pathway—would
leave in play that agent’s motivational resources, just as the LMC (on Ginet’s
imagined proposal) would demand. Yet it would seem that it would not be open
to the agent to do otherwise. To this Ginet might add a “no difference” principle:
The manipulation case can be set up so that there is no relevant difference
between it and a situation in which the action is causally determined by the laws
and past.
Garrett Pendergraft (2011) responds on behalf of the LMC that there may be
a compatibilist analysis of “can” that is not subject to a manipulation challenge.
But in favor of Ginet’s case one might argue that as long as an agent can satisfy
The analysis by way of a causal process, and the analysis does not rule out
manipulation by fiat, a manipulation case can be set up so that S satisfies the
analysis. As we can see, how Ginet’s response fares depends on how we assess
the manipulation argument. We will turn to this examination in Chapter 7.
Suggestions for Further Reading
Because the literature on the Consequence Argument is so very extensive, and
because it is also some of the most challenging work in the free will literature,
we believe it is best just to call attention to a small sample of the most central
contributions. See:
Beebee, Helen, and Alfred Mele. 2002. “Humean Compatibilism.” Mind 111: 201–33.
Fischer, John Martin. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Ginet, Carl. 1966. “Might We Have No Choice?” In Keith Lehrer, ed., Freedom and
Determinism. New York: Random House: 87–104.
Lewis, David. 1981. “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” Theoria 47: 113–21.
Slote, Michael. 1982. “Selective Necessity and the Free- Will Problem.” Journal of Philo-
sophy 79: 5–24.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1975. “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.” Philo-
sophical Studies 27: 185–99.
For a couple of thorough survey articles assessing at an advanced level the state
of the art regarding the Consequence Argument, see:
Kapitan, Tomis. 2002. “A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?” In R. Kane, ed., The
Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press: 127–57.
Speak, Dan. 2011. “The Consequence Argument Revisited.” In R. Kane, ed., The Oxford
Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press: 115–30.
For a thoughtful assessment of the (apparent) fall of the classical compatibilist
conditional analysis in relation to the wider dialectic and the contested force of
the Consequence Argument, one that resonates with our own assessment in the
earlier part of this chapter, see: