Strawsonian Compatibilism 145indeterminate between these two interpretations. Regardless, we also prescribe a
normative view as the correct one, if indeed any version of an interpersonal theory
is true.
8 On an affective theory of holding morally responsible, we can make sense of blaming
someone in the absence of experiencing one of these emotions. But in such cases, we
would do so by reference to the fact that in some manner such behavior still is liable
to elicit an emotional response. Or instead, such behavior would render it fitting or
appropriate to respond with a pertinent emotion (Wallace, 1994).
9 Excuses show that one is not to blame for a wrong done. Justifications show what one
did was not wrong.
10 Here we take some interpretive liberties by skating over one formulation of Straw-
son’s argument that would render it highly implausible. Strawson at one point charac-
terizes exemptions as reasons that show a person to be “psychologically abnormal”
(68). He then remarks that no universal plea could show everyone to be abnormal.
This invites a reading of his argument that makes it ripe for easy refutation. On its
face, it appears that he is making the point that abnormality is statistically at odds
with applying to all cases. Of course this is true, but it would not follow that every
person could not suffer from a condition that as a matter of statistical fact only few
actually suffer. In our estimation, Strawson should not be read in this way, but we
grant that the text invites this reading. For a defense of our interpretation of Strawson
on this point, see McKenna (2005b).
11 In this respect, Strawson’s argument is similar to one Daniel Dennett subsequently
advanced in “Mechanism and Responsibility” (1973), in which Dennett draws upon
Strawson’s 1962 paper.
12 See note 8 above.
13 See McKenna (2005b) for a development of this point.
14 This way of expressing the criticism is roughly the one set out by David Wiggins
(1973).
15 Several philosophers have raised this concern regarding Strawson’s argument, includ-
ing Bennett (1980), McKenna (1998), Russell (1992), Watson (1987), and Wiggins
(1973).
16 For one who resists this way of criticizing Strawson, see Seth Shabo (2012). Shabo,
fixing upon the emotion of love, argues that one cannot compartmentalize one’s emo-
tions so as to withhold some of the morally reactive attitudes (like a propensity to
resentment) without thereby being at odds with a loving attitude as well.