7 Three Source Incompatibilist Arguments
This chapter marks a point of transition. In the first half of this book we intro-
duced the free will debate and then considered its recent history. Chapter 1 was
devoted to getting clear on key concepts and related terminology. Chapter 2
introduced the free will problem, casting it as a collection of related problems.
Chapter 3 focused upon the classical compatibilist and incompatibilist views
from the history of philosophy, concentrating especially on the early twentieth
century. Then in the next three chapters, we examined the three most influential
contributions shaping the contemporary landscape. All of them originated in the
1960s. Collectively they set the stage for the current debates about free will and
moral responsibility. We are now prepared to consider the free will debate in its
most recent form.
To make this transition, it will be helpful to reflect upon the emerging dialect-
ical burdens faced by compatibilists and incompatibilists, especially in light of
two of those three recent historical influences: the Consequence Argument and
Frankfurt’s Argument against the alternative- possibilities requirement on moral
responsibility. Doing so will reveal the importance of arguments for incompati-
bilism that do not hinge on questions regarding the freedom to do otherwise.
7.1. The Emergence of Source Theories
So, how should we understand the dialectical burdens of the current contestants
in the free will debate? Recall the distinction, introduced in Chapter 2 (Section
2.3), between leeway freedom and source freedom. Leeway freedom crucially
features an ability to do otherwise and is understood in terms of a Garden of
Forking Paths Model of freedom. On this model, an agent’s freedom essentially
involves distinct possibilities for acting or refraining from acting, resulting in
alternative paths into the future, and the agent’s exercising control by settling
which path is realized. Source freedom crucially features an agent’s being the
causal origin of an action and is understood in terms of a Source Model of
freedom. On this model, freedom essentially involves the agent’s having a
certain role in the causal history of an action, a role that secures the agent’s
control by her being in some way its causal origin. As we set it out in Chapter 3,
the dominant center of attention within the framework of the classical debate