172 Three Source Incompatibilist Arguments
relying on background assumptions that we bring to ordinary life. In
this way, the intuitions are arguably more reliable than the real life ones.
(2013: 125)7.5. Closing Remarks on Arguments for Source
Incompatibilism
In this chapter we have focused upon three arguments for a source incompatibil-
ist conclusion. As we see it, the most compelling of these is (some instance of )
the Manipulation Argument. The Ultimacy Argument, we claimed, was to be
distinguished from an incompatibilist- friendly ultimacy thesis of the sort incom-
patibilists like Kane (1996) or Pereboom (2001; 2014) have endorsed. The Ulti-
macy Argument, in our opinion, is not compelling if it works with a folk notion
of ultimacy, and it is question- begging if it makes use of a more precise notion
of ultimacy, one that has built right into it a requirement of indeterminism. The
Direct Argument, we contended, while initially attractive, seems to rely upon an
inference principle like Transfer NR that needs supporting by way of uncontro-
versial instances of it. But the best candidates for such instances look to be those
figuring centrally in Manipulation Arguments for Incompatibilism. Thus, as
regards the dispute between source compatibilists and source incompatibilists, a
good deal turns on the force of a manipulation argument like Pereboom’s Four
Case Manipulation Argument.
We hasten to note, however, that all three of these arguments for source
incompatibilism are not the exclusive domain of source incompatibilists. A
leeway incompatibilist such as Ginet (1996) or van Inwagen (1983) can also
profit from them. Leeway incompatibilists are committed to an ability- to-do-
otherwise condition on free will and moral responsibility, and accordingly, they
seek to establish their incompatibilism on the basis of the Consequence Argu-
ment. But as Shabo (2010a) points out, allegiance to an alternative- possibilities
condition is consistent with also endorsing an incompatibilist source requirement
on free will and moral responsibility. It thus is open to incompatibilist defenders
of an alternative- possibilities condition to seek grounds for their incompatibilism
in consideration regarding causal sources of action, and as Shabo points out, this
is in fact Kane’s (1996) strategy.
Finally, we should also note that there is one further discussion in the liter-
ature that also points in the direction of a source incompatibilist conclusion, one
we have elected not to develop in this chapter. As we saw in Chapter 6, in an
influential article Gary Watson (1987) explores the presuppositions of Strawso-
nian compatibilism, and in particular whether, as Strawson (1962) contended, all
of the typical excusing or exempting conditions really are friendly to a compati-
bilist diagnosis. One of those excuses was being unfortunate in formative cir-
cumstances. Watson examined that sort of excuse (exemption) by considering
carefully a particularly disturbing application of it, the case of Robert Alton
Harris (which we considered in our Introduction). Harris committed two
horrible, cold- blooded murders. When hearing about it we are inclined in