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Notes
1 Admittedly, Frankfurt’s argument was designed to attack the proposition that moral
responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. But as we use the term “free will”
to identify the strongest sense of freedom required for moral responsibility, this slight
refocusing of Frankfurt’s argument is innocent enough.
2 Philosophers might legitimately persist in debating the apparent incompatibility
between leeway freedom and determinism irrespective of the matter of moral respons-
ibility. And here we do not wish to deny that this is in its own right an interesting
topic worthy of being regarded as a genuine free will problem. But it still would be a
distinct problem from one that is animated in terms of the conditions for moral
responsibility.