Seven Views of Contemporary Compatibilism 179historical requirements on freedom or responsibility are compatible with deter-
minism. Moreover, the historical compatibilist can argue, a historical constraint is
well- motivated for reasons entirely independent of the compatibilism/incompati-
bilism debate. The main motivation comes from reflection on a range of cases.
Suppose that a person is kidnapped and indoctrinated into a cult by brain-
washing, which results in a dramatic alteration of her personality (some readers
might recall the real- life case of Patty Hearst). Imagine that the outcome of the
process is a person who, by credible nonhistorical compatibilist standards, would
satisfy the conditions for acting freely. Many would nevertheless argue that such
a person does not act freely and is not morally responsible because the history
leading up to her being that way corrupts her agency. Compatibilists who take
this position contend that requiring that an agent not have such a history (a
negative requirement), or instead requiring that she does have a history that
involves acquiring certain beliefs and values under her own steam (a positive
requirement), is consistent with determinism being true. Such compatibilists will
claim that the conditions on freedom need to be supplemented with a historical
condition.
Because examples like the one above involving brainwashing are so disturb-
ing and seem to be so clearly freedom- and-responsibility- undermining, it is
perhaps surprising that numerous compatibilists have resisted arguments for a
historical conclusion and have opted for a nonhistorical thesis (e.g., Arpaly,
2003, 2006; Berofsky, 2006; Double, 1991; Frankfurt, 1975; McKenna, 2004;
Watson, 1999; Wolf, 1987). The best known advocate of the nonhistorical posi-
tion is Harry Frankfurt. Consider this often- quoted passage:
To the extent that a person identifies himself with the springs of his actions,
he takes responsibility for those actions and acquires moral responsibility
for them; moreover, the questions of how the actions and his identifications
with their springs are caused are irrelevant to the questions of whether he
performs his actions freely and is morally responsible for performing them.
(Frankfurt, 1975, as appearing in 1988: 54)Frankfurt would be prepared to say about our kidnapped and brainwashed person
that if she satisfied his proposed nonhistorical compatibilist conditions for acting
freely in the way required for moral responsibility, then she really does act
freely and is morally responsible for what she does in the aftermath of her
indoctrination.
We’ll not develop the controversy further here except to note how this debate
intersects with strategies compatibilists have for resisting various instances of
the Manipulation Argument. Recall McKenna’s (2008a) diagnosis of the policy
compatibilists should adopt toward responding to manipulation arguments (dis-
cussed in Section 7.4). Where possible, he claims, compatibilists should tend
toward a hardline reply because softline replies are unstable. Able incompatibil-
ist defenders of manipulation arguments are poised to revise their examples in
response to softline replies, thereby incorporating into revised manipulation