210 Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories
for the drug be and remain effective in leading him to action. Thus when he
takes the narcotic, he does so freely, and of his own free will, since he acts upon
the will that, at a higher order, he wants to have. However, due to his addictive
first- order desire, he is not free to have any other first- order desire be his will
other than the one that is. As a result, he lacks freedom of the will. Despite this,
Frankfurt contends, when he does take the drug, because he does so freely and of
his own free will, he is morally responsible for doing so.
In light of the above treatment, here is the necessary and sufficient condition
Frankfurt proposes for the freedom required for moral responsibility:
OFW: A person acts of her own free will if and only if her action issues
from the will with which she identifies by means of a higher- order volition.Susan Wolf (1990) has labeled Frankfurt’s theory a Real Self view, since the
core idea is that free and morally responsible agency is a matter of actions
issuing from one’s real or deep self. The idea is that when the desire that moves
an agent to action is not one with which she identifies in the way Frankfurt spec-
ifies, her conduct is alien to her. She is then impeded by another desire in a
manner analogous to how classical compatibilists held that external impedi-
ments, like shackles, impede agents.
9.3. Three Challenges to Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Theory
Frankfurt’s argument against the alternative possibilities requirement (Chapter
5 ) has had a considerable influence on contemporary work on free will and moral
responsibility. We will set these matters aside here, as we have already discussed
them. In this chapter, we will examine three aspects of Frankfurt’s positive
theory of source freedom as expressed in OFW.
9.3.1. Manipulation Arguments
One objection to Frankfurt’s theory focuses upon the sufficient condition speci-
fied in OFW. Don Locke (1975), Derk Pereboom (1995, 2001), and Robert Kane
(1996) have challenged Frankfurt by devising manipulation arguments (see
Section 7.4) featuring examples tailor-made to satisfy Frankfurt’s compatibilist
conditions. In each case, an agent is covertly manipulated into acquiring the
specified mesh of second- order volition, will, and action. Yet, due to the per-
vasive nature of the manipulation, it is contended that the agent does not act (or
will) freely and is not morally responsible.
More recently, Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Haji (1998), and Mele (1995,
2006b) have pressed the point as it bears on Frankfurt’s commitment to a non-
historical theory. To illustrate, consider Mele’s (1995: 145–6) case of two
agents, Ann and Beth (discussed in Section 8.6). Ann comes to be who she is
under her own steam. But Beth, who was not anything like Ann, is unknowingly