212 Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories
not act of her own free will. However, this would seem to count against OFW.
For it would seem better to deny that OFW gets the necessary conditions for
acting of one’s own free will and for being morally responsible right than to con-
clude that the weak- willed non- addict does not act of her own free will and is
not morally responsible.
Frankfurt could retreat to a revised and weaker version of OFW, i.e.:
OFW- sufficient: A person acts of her own free will if her action issues from
the will with which she identifies by means of a higher- order volition.This, unlike OFW, offers only a sufficient and not also a necessary condition for
acting of one’s own free will. But he then lacks an account for free will and
moral responsibility in the case of weakness of will. For weak- willed actions do
not issue from the will with which the agent identifies by means of a higher-
order volition, and yet weak- willed agents apparently can act of their own free
will in the sense required for moral responsibility. The problem is especially
puzzling in light of Frankfurt’s remark that his model “lends itself in fairly
obvious ways to the articulation and explication of... weakness of the will”
(1987, as reprinted in 1988: 165). More worrisome, if some distinct account of
freedom could explain how a weak- willed agent might act of her own free will
and be morally responsible, it would very likely provide an appealing basis for
explaining an agent’s freedom even when her will is aligned in Frankfurt’s pre-
ferred manner. This in turn would cast doubt, not on the truth, but on the explan-
atory relevance of OFW- sufficient.
9.3.3. Explaining Identification
A third objection to Frankfurt’s theory is that a crucial ingredient in OFW—
identification—obscures rather than illuminates the nature of free will. Watson
was the first to press this point (1975). Faced with the prospect of potential con-
flicts among higher- order desires, as explained above (Section 9.2), Frankfurt
appealed to the notion of identification via an agent’s decisive commitments.
He thereby claimed to specify which desires are truly one’s own and thus impli-
cated in one’s free will, and which desires are alienated from oneself. But,
Watson asks:
What gives these volitions any special relation to “oneself ”? It is unhelpful
to answer that one makes a “decisive commitment,” where this just means
that an interminable ascent to higher orders is not going to be permitted.
This is arbitrary. (1975 as reprinted in Watson, 2003: 349)Several of Frankfurt’s subsequent papers include attempts to offer a satisfactory
answer to Watson’s challenge.
In one response, Frankfurt specifies that identification involves two ingredi-
ents: an unopposed second- order volition to act in accord with a first- order