Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories 217Reasons- responsive theories have roots in the Aristotelian idea that the human
being is a rational animal, one that when mature can appreciate and be sensitive
to good reasons about how to live well, and how to make informed decisions.^12
In recent times, a number of philosophers have adopted some version of a
reasons- responsive theory, usually but not always in defense of compatibilism.^13
We have already canvassed three theses that can broadly be construed as
reasons- responsive theories. One was Dennett’s multiple viewpoints compatibi-
lism. As we explained (Section 8.4), according to Dennett, free will consists in
the ability of a person to control her behavior in light of rational considerations,
something that complex beings as evolved intentional, conscious systems even-
tually are able to do. Although he did not develop a reasons- responsiveness
theory of moral responsibility in detail, he was clearly committed to the general
thesis. Two other philosophers we’ve already considered also defend a reasons-
responsive theory, Wolf (1990) and Nelkin (2011). Their respective views are
distinctive insofar as responsiveness is understood in terms of a domain of
reasons in accord with which an agent should aim to act. For Wolf, this is under-
stood in terms of the True and the Good. For Nelkin, it is understood in terms of
good reasons.
In the upcoming sections, we will focus primarily on Fischer and Ravizza’s
reasons- responsive theory, as theirs is the most comprehensive, has been the
most influential, and has instigated a vast secondary literature.
9.7. Fischer and Ravizza’s Reasons- Responsive Theory
Fischer and Ravizza advance a version of the reasons- responsive view they call
semicompatibilism (1998: 51). This is the thesis that determinism is, or at least
might be, incompatible with leeway freedom, but is compatible with source
freedom. They characterize each of these freedoms in terms of control. Regula-
tive control requires the ability to do otherwise; guidance control does not.
Instead, guidance control is a source notion characterized in terms of the agent’s
rational capacities, in particular her responsiveness to reasons. Regulative
control and leeway freedom are not required for moral responsibility, they argue,
since Frankfurt’s argument against the alternative possibilities requirement is
successful.
On its face, a reasons- responsive view is ill- suited for theorists who endorse
Frankfurt’s argument. A natural way to specify that an agent is responsive to
reasons is that her actions are motivated by the reasons relevant to her situation
and available to her, and if there had been such reasons sufficient for refraining
from an action, she would have refrained instead and thus would have acted
otherwise. But in Frankfurt examples (Chapter 5), agents seem not to be respon-
sive to reasons in this way. If sufficient reasons for refraining from the action
had been presented to them, these agents would not be able to act otherwise, due
to the presence of the intervener or intervention device. But Fischer and Ravizza
contend that, despite this hurdle, Frankfurt’s argument can be wedded to a
reasons- responsiveness analysis.