Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories 219action, while reactivity is the capacity to act in accord with such recognition and
evaluation of reasons. Significantly, Fischer and Ravizza’s proposal involves an
asymmetry. Guidance control, they contend, requires regularly receptivity of a
mechanism to reasons, but only its weak reactivity to reasons. To capture the
spectrum of reasons to which an agent’s mechanism must be regularly receptive,
they specify that that spectrum exhibit a pattern of rational stability (70–1). It
must also pass a sanity test, such that a third- party inquirer could come to under-
stand the pattern of reasons the agent would accept (71–2). Also, some of the
reasons must be minimally moral, which is needed to rule out smart animals,
very young children, and, perhaps, psychopaths (76–81). As for reactivity,
Fischer and Ravizza argue that it is sufficient that an agent act from a mech-
anism such that there is just one possible world in which that mechanism oper-
ates and the agent reacts differently to a sufficient reason to do otherwise (73).
They also argue that “reactivity is all of a piece” (73). That is, a mechanism’s
reacting to a sufficient reason to do otherwise in some possible world establishes
that mechanisms of this type have the general capacity to react differently to any
sufficient reason to do otherwise.
There is one further essential element in Fischer and Ravizza’s specification
of moderate reasons- responsiveness, and thus in their preferred notion of guid-
ance control. In order for an agent to exercise this sort of control, the mechanism
on which she acts must be her own. This ownership condition is meant to ensure
that the agent’s mechanism is not alien to her, that it was not, for example,
installed by means of brainwashing or covert electronic manipulation. Owner-
ship features three conditions. First, the agent must come to view herself, when
acting from relevant mechanisms, as an agent, capable of shaping the world by
her choices and actions. Second, she must see herself as an apt target of others’
moral expectations and demands as revealed in the reactive attitudes. Third, the
beliefs satisfying the first two conditions must be based, in an appropriate way,
on the individual’s evidence (238).
Fischer and Ravizza’s ownership condition introduces a historical element
into their account. This distinguishes their view from, for example, Frankfurt’s
nonhistorical theory, and allows them to argue that in relevant cases of manipu-
lation, such as that of Mele’s Beth discussed above (Section 3.1, and Section
8.6), the agent is not morally responsible.
9.8. Three Challenges to Fischer and Ravizza’s Theory
There are a few features of Fischer and Ravizza’s complete theory of moral
responsibility we will not take up here, since we have devoted considerable
attention to these topics already. One is their contribution to the debate over
Frankfurt’s attack on leeway freedom (e.g., Fischer, 2002). Another is their
effort to establish the resilience of the Consequence Argument (e.g., Fischer,
2004; Fischer and Ravizza, 1998; Ravizza, 1994). A third is their objections
against the source incompatibilists’ Direct Argument. In this section, we will
focus instead on three important challenges to their position.