220 Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories
9.8.1. Receptivity and Reactivity
Patrick Todd and Neal Tognazzini contend that there is a missing element in
Fischer and Ravizza’s account of receptivity (Todd and Tognazzini, 2008). As
Fischer and Ravizza formulate the view, it is possible that an agent act from a
mechanism that is regularly receptive to a number of reasons to do otherwise,
but is not receptive to the actual moral reasons to do otherwise that are present
in her context of action—the agent, by way of her mechanism, is incapable of
recognizing the force of these pertinent reasons. Todd and Tognazzini would
appear to be right to argue that such an agent is not morally responsible. Indeed,
their worry is of a piece with what motivates philosophers like Wolf (1990) and
Nelkin (2011) to explain reasons- responsiveness in a way that secures sensitivity
to good reasons. Accordingly, Todd and Tognazzini propose an amendment to
Fischer and Ravizza’s view: Receptivity should include not just an appropriately
sane pattern of reasons- recognition, but also receptivity to the actual moral
reasons bearing on her context of action.
Now consider reactivity. Fischer and Ravizza claim that, so long as an agent’s
mechanism is reactive to just one sufficient reason to do otherwise in some pos-
sible world, this confirms their “reactivity is all of a piece” thesis according to
which the agent, via her mechanism, has the general capacity to react differently
to any reason to do otherwise. But this seems to allow for guidance control cases
in which an agent is patently unfree (e.g., McKenna, 2005a; Mele, 2000, 2006a;
Russell, 2002a; Watson, 2001). For instance, Mele offers the case of an agora-
phobic incapable of leaving his house even to attend his daughter’s wedding,
though he would leave it if it were set on fire (2000, 2006a). Fischer and Raviz-
za’s thesis would specify that this agoraphobic has the general capacity to react
differently to any reason to leave the house, which would appear incorrect. The
upshot is that what Fischer and Ravizza need, as McKenna has put it (2005a), is
not regular receptivity and weak reactivity, but instead regular receptivity and
weaker reactivity (see also Pereboom, 2006b). This allows them to make room
for cases in which a blameworthy agent recognizes sufficient moral reasons to
do otherwise but does not act on them. In response to these objections (espe-
cially Mele’s formulation), Fischer has conceded the point and now accepts the
proposed emendation (2005: 154 n. 3).
9.8.2. Mechanisms and Agents
Fischer and Ravizza admit that they have no principle for mechanism individua-
tion whereby, when we “hold fixed” the mechanism across possible worlds, we
can identify that very same mechanism in other possible worlds. They instead
rely upon an intuitive notion of sameness (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998: 40).
Several critics have objected to this element of their account (Judisch, 2005;
McKenna, 2001; Shabo, 2005; Watson, 2001). At a crucial juncture, Fischer and
Ravizza consider an objection that focuses on a non- addict who acts from a par-
ticular mechanism in taking a drug and who would refrain from doing so only