226 Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories
of the following form. Suppose that the sea is very cold, and Brown knows it,
and as a result it is psychologically impossible for him to choose to jump into
the sea. But we might suppose that if he did choose to jump, he would actually
jump. Thus here (2) is true, and yet it is intuitive that (1) is false—Brown could
not have jumped into the sea. The conclusion is that (2) is not a correct analysis
of (1).^19
Vihvelin criticizes these kinds of objections using her core positive idea: that
abilities to do otherwise are to be characterized in terms of intrinsic dispositions,
that is, dispositions of agents that consist in intrinsic properties—by contrast
with extrinsic or relational properties—that agents have. Because the essential
features of such intrinsic dispositions are not analyzed conditionally, her view
gains immunity to the assault on conditional analyses. An impressive feature of
Vihvelin’s development of this position is her defense of its explanatory power:
In various key respects, it admirably does the work it needs to do in order to
count as a contending theory.^20
In her analysis, Vihvelin distinguishes between narrow and wide abilities. A
narrow ability to A, where A- ing is some type of action, is, as Vihvelin puts it, a
matter of “what it takes” to A (2013: 11). What it takes to A, she holds, includes
whatever skills, competence, or know- how are required to A—and to do it
without too much luck. A narrow ability also involves “the psychological and
physical capacity to use” the required skills or exercise the competence or know-
how. Usain Bolt can run 100 meters in ten seconds, but lacks a narrow ability to
do so if he is asleep. Having a wide ability to A is having a narrow ability to A
and being in circumstances amenable to the exercise of that ability. One must
have the means and the opportunity to A, and there must be nothing external that
stands in one’s way. Despite being able to run 100 meters in ten seconds when
in propitious circumstances, Bolt lacks a wide ability to do so now if he’s asleep
on swampy ground.
Vihvilin proposes a specific definition for the sort of ability required for
free will:
LCA- PROP-Ability: S has the narrow ability at time t to do R in response to
the stimulus of S’s trying to do R if, for some intrinsic property B that S has
at t, and for some time t′ after t, if S were in a test- case at t and S tried to do
R and S retained property B until time t′, then in a suitable proportion of
these cases, S’s trying to do R and S’s having of B would be an S- complete
cause of S’s doing R. (187)This is a complex characterization. Some of the complexity arises from the fact
that free will does not require success in every possible case in which the agent
tried to do otherwise. Hence, Vihvelin specifies that she succeeds in a suitable
proportion of test cases.
There are a number of pertinent questions one might ask about this proposal.
One objection we would like to highlight is due to Clarke (2014a),^21 and it
begins by pointing out that the way it secures compatibility with determinism is