250 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism
O’Connor provides a specific account about how the propensities of the agent-
causal power are structured by reasons, and we’ve noted reconciliation problems
with this feature of his position.
To the idea that an appeal to reasons can serve to meet the demand for con-
trastive explanations he sets out, Ginet objects that there are cases in which an
agent causes an event at one particular time rather than at some other time, but
reasons can’t explain why:
My reason for picking up the phone does not explain why I picked it up pre-
cisely when I did rather than a few seconds earlier or later, and I need not
have had any reason for choosing that precise time rather than a slightly dif-
ferent earlier or later one. It is possible that there was nothing at all that
explains why the one thing was the case rather than any alternative.... But
in that case, it seems natural to infer, there was nothing that caused the one
rather than any alternative. (Ginet, 1997: 94–5)Similarly, for the “sort of event” problem,
My reason for picking up the telephone was that I wanted to make a call.
But that reason does not explain why I used my left rather than my right
hand to pick it up, and indeed I need not have had any reason for using one
hand rather than the other. (Ginet, 1997: 94)However, here the agent- causal libertarian can also build the capacity that under-
writes the contrastive explanation into the agent- causal power: It’s also a power,
fundamentally as a substance, to cause a choice of a particular sort and at a par-
ticular time, without being causally determined to do so. This agent- causal
power itself would then explain how the agent might cause the right- hand choice
by contrast with the left- hand choice, and cause this choice at t1 rather than at
some other time, all without invoking reasons. So why did he make the right-
hand choice at t1 and not the left? The answer is: because he exercised his agent-
causal power at t1 to make a right- hand choice rather than exercising it to make
the left.
One might raise the concern that the strategy of building new elements into
the agent- causal power in response to demands for contrastive explanation is too
facile. The assumption on the agent- causal libertarian’s part would be that this
power can be expanded without cost to respond to any such demand. But the
concern is that as the power inflates, the sense increases that what is being
invoked is in fact a kind of deus ex machina with dubious explanatory value.
The agent- causal libertarian might respond that once the agent- causal power is
on board, it’s legitimate to supply it with what’s required to act rationally and to
act in particular ways at particular times. After all, these are just ordinary agen-
tial capacities, and it’s to be expected that whatever it is that causes actions
would possess them.