256 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism
Perhaps the most important test for any libertarian theory is its capacity to
respond adequately to the various versions of the luck objection. As we pointed
out in the account of agent causation, to fix the problem disclosed by the luck
objection, and the disappearing agent version in particular, what arguably needs
to be added to the libertarian account under consideration is involvement of the
agent in the production of her decisions that would allow her to settle which
decision occurs. To answer the luck objection the agent- causal libertarian thus
appeals to the controversial notion of substance- causation. But one might
contend, as Ginet specifically does, that a non- causal position fares at least as
well. On his proposal, an agent’s substance- causing basic actions would have no
advantage over her simply performing such acts, where “performing” can be ana-
lyzed non- causally—in terms of the agent’s being the subject of the act and an
actish phenomenological feel (Ginet, 1990). This position has the advantage of
avoiding an appeal to the controversial notion of substance causation.
Here is Ginet’s position on free action set out in detail (1997, 2007):
- Every action either is or begins with a simple mental action, a mental event
that does not consist of one mental event causing others. - A simple mental event is an action if and only if it has a certain intrinsic
phenomenological quality, that is, an “actish” quality. - A simple mental event’s having this intrinsic actish phenomenological
quality is sufficient for its being an action, but not for its being a free action. - A simple mental free action must, in addition, not be causally necessitated
by antecedent events (Ginet, 1996), and not even probabilistically caused by
antecedent events (2007).
Ginet’s account holds out the promise of a solution to the problem posed by the
disappearing agent objection without resorting to the controversial notion of
substance- causation.
The leading sort of objection to non- causal accounts of free will and moral
responsibility is that these notions require control, and control is fundamentally
a causal notion (Clarke, 2003; O’Connor, 2000). The non- causalist will of course
deny this, and claim that his conditions are sufficient for the requisite control.
But a concern one might have about non- causal views generally is that they
project a sense of control by using causal language, while at the same time disa-
vowing causal notions.
In view of this concern, Pereboom (2014) sets out a dilemma for non- causal
theories. When advocates of non- causalism use prima facie causal language to
express the purportedly non- causal relation, either causation is being invoked, or
if it is not, the control required for moral responsibility is absent. Let us examine
Ginet’s view as a test case. He remarks:
[Making] It was up to me at time T whether that event would occur only if I
made it the case that it occurred and it was open to me at T to keep it from
occurring. (2007: 245)