Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 259centuries, and one also finds it in Donald Davidson’s (1970) anomalous monism
about mental events. In opposition to this tradition, Michael Tooley (1990, 1997)
contends that there can be instances of causation that do not fall under any
general law, deterministic or probabilistic. Kant (1781/1787/1987) in effect
argues that this is at least a prima facie conceptual possibility.
Suppose that the non- causalist claimed that if a “making happen” relation is
not law- governed, it does not qualify as causal. How substantive, as opposed to
merely verbal, would this contention be in the context of the present debate? If
what the non- causalist is proposing is that the relation between the subject and
the action is a making- happen or a difference- making relation that is non- causal
only because it is not governed by any sort of causal law, one might respond that
he is invoking the sort of singular relation that Tooley defends, even though he
won’t call it a causal relation. If this is in fact so, the dispute between the two
sides, in particular between the non- causalist and the agent- causalist, would
threaten to be merely verbal. To join the issue, following David Chalmers’s
(2011) recommendation for resolving merely verbal disputes, it would be advis-
able to drop the term “causal” from the discussion, and speak instead of “making
happen” and “difference- making.” But it would then appear that causalists and
non- causalists could agree that the relation between agent and a free basic action
is a making- happen or a difference- making relation, which would seem to be the
core issue in the controversy.
Suppose we abandon language involving the term “cause” and restrict our-
selves to talk of making happen and difference- making. We can then ask the
indeterminist non- causalist whether she agrees that in the case of a free action,
the agent makes the action happen or makes the difference whether the decision
happens. If the response is positive, then the next question to ask is whether
agents making actions happen or making the difference whether actions happen
reduces to agent- involving events making actions happen or making the differ-
ence whether actions happen. If so, then the problem of the disappearing agent
arises again. If not, then it appears we are left with the view that agents- as-
substances make actions happen or make the difference whether actions happen.
But then there would be no substantive difference between the agent- causal and
“non- causal” positions.
10.13. The Cost of Rejecting Libertarianism
We believe, along with many libertarians, that the best prospect for libertarian-
ism is an agent- causal version, and one that rejects the project of reconciling the
account with our best physical theories. In addition, one might adduce non-
evidential reasons to opt for such a view. Daniel Speak (2004) argues that those
who have cautiously rejected libertarianism about free will on evidential grounds
have perhaps overlooked an important feature of justification: a pragmatic and
axiological component. Faith in a moral order is laudable, and it sometimes
requires belief when it is not adequately supported by the evidence alone—that
is, when the evidentialist about justification view recommends that we refrain