Contemporary Incompatibilism: Skeptical Views 283transformation her view recommends. So even if the best personal relationships
do not require a disposition to moral anger, it may be that there is no mechanism
generally available to us by which we might eradicate this disposition, or radic-
ally curtail its manifestations. Nichols (2007) cites the distinction between
narrow- profile emotional responses, which are local or immediate emotional
reactions to situations, and wide- profile responses, which are not immediate and
can involve rational reflection. As free will skeptics we might expect that we
will be unable to significantly reduce narrow- profile, immediate moral anger
when we are seriously wronged in our most intimate personal relationships. But
in wide- profile cases, we might well be able to diminish, or even eliminate moral
anger, or at least disavow it in the sense of rejecting any force it might be
thought to have in justifying harmful reactions to the wrong done. Such modifi-
cation of moral anger and its typical presuppositions, aided by this conviction,
might well be advantageous for our relationships.
Guilt and repentance are also threatened by free will skepticism, and one
might argue that this consequence is more difficult to accommodate. There is
much at stake here, the objector might contend, because these self- directed atti-
tudes are required for good relationships for agents like us who can behave
immorally. Without guilt and repentance, we would not be motivated to moral
improvement after acting badly, we would be kept from restoring relationships
impaired as a result, and we would be barred from reestablishing moral integrity.
For absent guilt and repentance none of our psychological mechanisms can
generate these effects. The skeptic’s position would undercut guilt because it
essentially involves a sense that one is blameworthy in the basic desert sense for
an immoral action. If someone did not feel blameworthy in this way for the
action he would also not feel guilty for it. Moreover, because feeling guilty is
undermined by the skeptical view, repentance is also no longer an option, since
feeling guilty is a prerequisite for a repentant attitude.
Suppose that you behave badly in the context of a relationship, but because
you believe that free will skepticism is true, you reject the claim that you are
blameworthy in the basic desert sense. However, you acknowledge that you have
behaved badly, you feel deeply disappointed in yourself, and as Bruce Waller
advocates, you feel deep sorrow and regret for what you have done (Waller,
1990: 165–6; cf. Bok, 1998). In addition, you resolve to do what you can to
eradicate your disposition to behave this way, and you seek help to make this
change. These responses arguably can realize the good that guilt is apt to
achieve, and they are compatible with the skeptic’s conviction.
Gratitude might appear to presuppose that the agent to whom one is grateful
is morally responsible in the basic desert sense for a beneficial act, whereupon a
skeptical conviction would undermine this attitude (Honderich, 1988: 518–19).
But even if this is so, as in the case of forgiveness, certain core aspects would
remain unaffected, and these aspects can provide what is required for good per-
sonal relationships. Gratitude involves, first of all, being thankful toward
someone who has acted beneficially. True, being thankful toward someone often
involves the belief that she is praiseworthy in the basic desert sense for some