284 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Skeptical Views
action. Still, one can be thankful to a young child for some kindness without
believing that she is praiseworthy in this way. This aspect of gratitude could be
retained even without the supposition that the other is responsible in the basic
desert sense. Gratitude typically also involves joy as a response to what someone
has done. The skeptical view does not pose a threat to the legitimacy of being
joyful and expressing joy when others are considerate or generous on one’s
behalf.
11.9. Final Words
Living without a conception of our actions as freely willed in the sense required
for basic desert moral responsibility does not come naturally to us. Our natural
reactions to good and bad actions presuppose that we are free in this sense. But,
as free will skeptics see it, there is a strong case to be made against this presup-
position, and also, despite our initially apprehensive reaction to skepticism
about this sort of free will, endorsing this perspective would not have unac-
ceptable consequences for us. According to these skeptics, it would not ser-
iously threaten meaning in life, because it is compatible with a veridical sense
of accomplishment when we succeed in our projects. It would not hinder the
possibility of the good personal relationships, but even holds out the promise of
greater equanimity by reducing the moral anger that often impairs them. So, the
free will skeptic contends, if we did in fact give up the assumption of the sort of
free will at issue, then, perhaps surprisingly, we might well be better off as a
result.
Suggestions for Further Reading
Here is a list of books of the last quarter- century arguing for some type of skep-
tical view about free will from a philosophical perspective:
Caruso, Gregg. 2012. Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion
of Free Will. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Double, Richard. 1996. Metaphilosophy and Free Will. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Double, Richard. 1991. The Non- Reality of Free Will. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Honderich, Ted. 1988. A Theory of Determinism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Levy, Neil. 2011. Hard Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, Derk. 2014. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Pereboom, Derk. 2001. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Smilansky, Saul. 2000. Free Will and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sommers, Tamler. 2012. Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral
Responsibility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Strawson, Galen. 1986. Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.