Revisionism and Some Remaining Issues 293(2013: 7) Vargas succeeds by attending to the work the folk concept of respons-
ibility does in regulating our judgments about when agents deserve praise and
blame. This is to be done by attending to the internal logic and structure of what
he calls the responsibility system (Vargas, 2013: 101). Upon seeing what work
is to be done by an adequate concept of responsibility, one can then refashion
the concept to do this work in revised ways that depart from the folk notion—
and most notably cut away the libertarian requirements found in the folk
conception.
So McCormick (2013) contends that Vargas can answer the McKenna/Pere-
boom reference- anchoring challenge. Here, we wish to remain open- minded and
leave the dispute unsettled. Part of what is at issue turns on whether we can after
all assess this controversy while bracketing the role of basic desert- entailing
moral responsibility. Some are liable to contend that this notion has to be in the
mix to avoid a charge of changing the subject.^4 But with this large question kept
at a distance, McCormick’s defense of Vargas is reasonable. One point, however,
that could pose a problem for Vargas (independently of questions concerning
basic desert) turns on the distinction Vargas draws between the moral responsib-
ility system and the work the folk concept does within it, on the one hand, and
the folk concept itself, on the other. A natural way to understand our actual
moral responsibility practices of praising and blaming is that they are themselves
animated and informed by the folk concepts that are currently in dispute. It is not
clear that one can identify and account for the role of the work of the concept in
a set of practices in a way that pulls apart from the concept itself.
Vargas provides us with an interesting and important proposal for negotiating
the territory of free will and moral responsibility, one that opts to revise folk
concepts but keep the revision of folk practice to a minimum. By contrast, Pere-
boom’s free will skepticism does not advocate conceptual revision, but rather a
substantial change of practice.
12.2. Responsibility for Omissions
We turn now to a relatively brief treatment of a number of issues and trends in
the free will debate that have been prominent in recent years. One topic that is
currently being discussed intensely is moral responsibility for omissions.
Responsibility for decisions not to perform actions, for example a decision not to
help someone in trouble, can be treated in the same way as decisions to perform
actions. Both of these kinds of cases feature a basic action, a decision, and con-
ditions on responsibility for the basic action will be similar. One complicated
issue arises in such cases, however, and that concerns responsibility for out-
comes of decisions.
Very interesting issues arise in cases in which what is omitted is the decision
itself. Responsibility for some such omissions can be accounted for as cases of
derivative responsibility, which has a key epistemic component (Chapter 6). For
example, suppose Biff knows that when he gets drunk he tends not to keep track
of duties he has. Had he not been drunk, he would have decided at 3 p.m. to take