304 Revisionism and Some Remaining Issues
11.8), and David Lewis (1993), for example, argues that the free will answer to
the problem of evil is weak, and if he is right, giving it up would not be costly.
Thus the free will problem arises in a stark form within the theological
context. Libertarianism clearly allows for basic desert moral responsibility and
for a promising avenue of response to the problem of evil, but it is vulnerable on
the issue of divine providence. Compatibilism also allows for basic desert, and is
not vulnerable on providence, but it falters on the free will response to evil. Free
will skepticism secures a strong notion of providence while relinquishing basic
desert and the free will response. Historically, theists are divided between liber-
tarianism and compatibilism, with very few taking the skeptical route. But the
plausibility of these positions independent of theological considerations is a
further factor to be considered.
12.6. Conclusion
We began this book in our preface with a promise to be as even- handed as pos-
sible in treating the range of positions, arguments, and topics animating the free
will debate. We also promised not to advance our own views. The astute reader
will likely have noticed several places where perhaps we have not lived up to
our promise, despite our best efforts to do so. Nevertheless, we aspire to having
offered readers enough resources to pursue the free will issue in a myriad
number of ways, and we hope we have done so in a way that has genuinely chal-
lenged the committed student of philosophy.
Suggestions for Further Reading
Because we have canvassed several different topics here, we will offer only a
few suggestions for each.
On revisionism, see:
McCormick, Kelly. 2013. “Anchoring a Revisionist Account of Moral Responsibility.”
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7: 1–19.
Vargas, Manuel. 2013. Building Better Beings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
On omissions, see:
Clarke, Randolph. 2014b. Omissions. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sher, George. 2009. Who Knew? New York: Oxford University Press.
On deliberation, see:
Coffman, E.J., and T. Warfield. 2005. “Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom.”
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 25–44.
Nelkin, Dana. 2011. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press: chapter 6.