Revisionism and Some Remaining Issues 305Pereboom, Derk. 2014. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press: chapter 5.
On experimental philosophy, see:
Knobe, Joshua, and Shaun Nichols, eds., 2008. Experimental Philosophy, vol 1. New
York: Oxford University Press.
On free will and religion, see:
Frede, Michael. 2011. A Free Will. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Lewis, David. 1993. “Evil for Freedom’s Sake?” Philosophical Papers 22: 149–72.
Pereboom, Derk. 2012b. “Theological Determinism and Divine Providence.” In Ken
Perszyk, ed., Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press:
262–79.
Plantinga, Alvin. 1974. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
Speak, Daniel. 2014. The Problem of Evil. Cambridge: Polity.
Swinburne, Richard. 1999. Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
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Timpe, Kevin. 2014. Free Will in Philosophical Theology. New York: Bloomsbury.
Notes
1 Below, we will explain and assess this experimental philosophical work, known as
X- phi. For now, it is enough to note that this research is devoted to employing empiri-
cal research techniques in the social sciences to help determine what people’s actual
commonsense beliefs, concepts, and intuitions are.
2 Note the similarity here to the sort of reasons- responsive views of compatibilists like
Wolf and Nelkin (discussed in Chapter 8).
3 Roughly, the difference between a concept and a conception is that the latter can be
understood as an attempt to give content to the former. Our concept of water, for
instance, was around in Aristotle’s time, well before anyone understood that water
was H 2 O. But with this type of advance in knowledge, we also developed a concep-
tion of water Aristotle did not have, part of which is that “water” refers to a chemical
compound.
4 Incidentally, on this point, as co-authors, we should note that we are divided. Pere-
boom is committed to this thesis. McKenna is not; he wishes to remain agnostic.
5 Randolph Clarke (2014b: 171–2) models a case on Sher’s, and makes a similar
assessment.
6 Manuel Vargas and Samuel Murray have been awarded a Templeton Foundation
grant to study self- control, and the notion of vigilance has an important place in this
project. Murray is working on a view according to which failures of vigilance explain
responsibility for omissions in cases beyond those involving danger, and in accord
with this aim, the notion of vigilance he is working with is significantly broader than
Pereboom’s.
7 For discussions of this type of view, see Kapitan (1986); Searle (2001); Nelkin
(2004a, 2004b, 2011: 117–69); Coffman and Warfield (2005).