306 Revisionism and Some Remaining Issues
8 Nelkin (2011: 139–44) aims to capture the force of such a two- condition account with
a unitary condition, one that features the idea that deliberation is the critical explan-
atory nexus or difference- maker as to which option for action is realized (cf. Dennett,
1984: 118).
9 See Nahmias et al. (2006); Nahmias et al. (2007); Nichols and Knobe (2007); Deery
et al. (2013).
10 See Nahmias and Murray (2010); Murray and Nahmias (2014); for criticisms, see
Rose and Nichols (2013); Chan et al. (2016); Björnsson (2014) and (ms); Björnsson
and Pereboom (2014, 2016).
11 See Sripada (2012); Feltz (2013); Murray and Lombrozo (forthcoming); Björnsson
and Pereboom (2016).
12 Nahmias et al. (2006: 30–2) argue that incompatibilism is in particular need of intu-
itive support given that it postulates metaphysically stronger requirements on respons-
ibility. But one might also think that what is in particular need of justification are
claims that some people deserve to be treated better or worse than others. This would
put a greater burden of justification on compatibilism, as it postulates weaker restric-
tions on when blame and credit are deserved.
13 Björnsson and Persson (2012, 2013) can be viewed as generalizing this strategy to a
wider range of phenomena.
14 Michael Frede (2011) argues that the notion of free will and the free will debate have
their origins in theistic contexts in the ancient world.
15 For a comprehensive exposition and defense of Molina’s position, see Thomas Flint
(1998).