316 Bibliography
Libet, Benjamin. 2004. Mind Time. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Libet, Benjamin. 1985. “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will
in Voluntary Action.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8: 529–66.
Locke, Don. 1975. “Three Concepts of Free Action I.” Proceedings of Aristotelian
Society supp., vol. IL: 95–112.
Locke, John. 1965. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Collier.
Loewenstein, Yael. Forthcoming. “Why the Direct Argument Does not Shift the Burden
of Proof.” Journal of Philosophy.
Lowe, E.J. 2008. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Lucretius. 50 bce. De Rerum Natura. Trans. W.H.D. Rouse, Loeb Classical Library, 1982.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mackie, J.L. 1955. “Evil and Omnipotence.” Mind 64: 200–12.
Manekin, C.H., and M. Kellner, eds., 1997. Freedom and Moral Responsibility: General
and Jewish Perspectives. College Park, MD: University of Maryland Press.
Markosian, Ned. 2010. “Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist’s Prob-
lems.” Philosophical Studies 157: 383–98.
Markosian, Ned. 1999. “A Compatibilist View of the Theory of Agent Causation.” Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 80: 257–77.
Matheson, Benjamin. Forthcoming. “In Defense of the Four- Case Argument.” Philosoph-
ical Studies.
McCann, Hugh. 1998. The Works of Agency. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
McCormick, Kelly. 2013. “Anchoring a Revisionist Account of Moral Responsibility.”
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7: 1–19.
McKay, Thomas, and David Johnson. 1996. “A Reconsideration of an Argument against
Incompatibilism.” Philosophical Topics 24: 113–22.
McKenna, Michael. 2014. “Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard- liner Takes it
on the Chin.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89: 467–84.
McKenna, Michael. 2013. “Reasons- Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms.” In
David Shoemaker, ed., Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 1. Oxford:
Oxford University Press: 151–84.
McKenna, Michael. 2012. Conversation and Responsibility. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
McKenna, Michael. 2011. “Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-
Responsive Theories.” In Robert Kane, ed., Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edn.
New York: Oxford University Press: 175–98.
McKenna, Michael. 2009a. “Compatibilism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(original 2004), Edward N. Zalta, ed. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/
entries/compatibilism.
McKenna, Michael. 2009b. “Compatibilism and Desert: Critical Comments on Four
Views on Free Will.” Philosophical Studies 144: 3–13.
McKenna, Michael. 2008a. “A Hard- line Reply to Pereboom’s Four- case Argument.”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 142–59.
McKenna, Michael. 2008b. “Frankfurt’s Argument against Alternative Possibilities:
Looking beyond the Example.” Noûs 42: 770–93.
McKenna, Michael. 2008c. “Saying Goodbye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.”
Philosophical Review 117 (3): 349–83.
McKenna, Michael. 2008d. “Ultimacy & Sweet Jane.” In Nick Trakakis and Daniel
Cohen, eds., Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Newcastle: Cambridge
Scholars Publishing: 186–208.