34 The Free Will Problem
to be plausible. Even in simple cases of a trivial sort, such as choosing between
kinds of pasta in the grocery store, we have the sense that we are free to choose
among options and that however we choose, we are the source of that course of
action; our so acting was, on the occasion, up to us.
Now consider a different source of the apparent plausibility of free will. Most
of us are familiar with circumstances in which we struggle with temptation.
Sometimes we fail. Cheesecake is after all mighty tasty, and that third (or fourth)
martini in the company of an old friend can seem like such good fun. But some-
times we succeed. On these occasions, one has the sense that when the pressures
of one’s desires or cravings are bearing down, one is still free to resist them,
perhaps in light of what one judges is really best. Indeed, we describe such occa-
sions in terms of exercising will power or self- control. Furthermore, our thinking
about these cases is not limited to first- personal experience. When assessing the
admirable or instead lamentable conduct of others, we assume that they too are
free either to give in to their cravings or resist them. The friend struggling to quit
smoking or stop binge eating, we often think, has the ability to control how she
behaves, and so is free to exercise strength or instead weakness of will.
In addition, we generally assume in our interpersonal lives that our close
friends, intimate others, acquaintances, co- workers, and so on, are in control of
their lives. The thought here is not (or at least need not be) connected with assump-
tions about moral responsibility. Instead it regards simple interpersonal expecta-
tions about who cares for us and who does not, and how and why they elect to act
the way they do in how they treat us and others. While love might not be subject to
a person’s free will, there is a common assumption that those who love us, and as
well those who hate us, freely treat us as they do. And our responses to them belie
our presumption that they are, in some way, in control of their manner of dealing
with us and those we care about. Hence, we are prone to feel resentment or instead
gratitude for the slight or instead the kindness of a friend or a co- worker.
Moreover, these assumptions about freedom are also often implicit in our
assessment of the choices people make enabling them to live meaningful or
meaningless lives. Our assessment of intimate others, of ourselves, and, for that
matter, near strangers, is often built upon the presupposition that the value or
meaning of their lives and ours is in part a function of the fact that it was or is
the product of exercising free will. We might say of someone whose history
included some great misfortune that she picked herself up by her own bootstraps
and made something of her life, thereby expressing our admiration. And we
think of those with promise and opportunity who squandered their lives on fri-
volities, drink, or shallow fleeting interests, that they threw their lives away.
Here, this talk of picking oneself up or of throwing away one’s life seems
implicitly to involve the presumption that these people acted freely—they were
in control of building themselves up or instead wrecking themselves. Thus there
is a pervasive picture of free agency that is naturally associated with these
thoughts about the meaningfulness and the meaninglessness of life.
If we were to have to give up as rationally justified our belief that most
persons have free will, it seems that we would have to revise significantly our