Citizenship and liberalism
The notion of citizenship arises with ancient Greek thinkers (much of the argument
here follows Hoffman [2004]). The citizen is traditionally and classically defined as
one who has the ability and chance to participate in government (by which is meant
the state), but in Aristotle’s aristocratic view, citizenship should not only exclude
slaves, foreigners and women, but should be restricted to those who are relieved of
menial tasks (Aristotle, 1962: 111).
We must always bear this in mind when the argument is put for a ‘revitalisation’
and extension of the Aristotelian ideal of citizenship as the alternation of ruling and
being ruled (Voet, 1998: 137). For the positive attributes of ancient Greek theory
are undermined by the fact that they express themselves through gender, ethnic and
(it should not be forgotten) imperial hierarchies, and we need to challenge the elitist
notion of citizenship that the ancient Greeks took for granted.
Even when slavery was apparently rejected by a liberal view of humanity, the
concept of citizenship has remained limited and exclusionary. It is revealing that
Rousseau insists that the ‘real meaning’ of citizenship is only respected when the
word is used selectively and exclusively (1968: 61). Citizens have property, are
national (in their political orientation), and are public and male. Even the classical
liberal opposition between citizenship and slavery is weakened by Rousseau’s
astonishing comment that in unfortunate situations (as in ancient Greece) ‘the citizen
can be perfectly free only if the slave is absolutely a slave’ (1968: 143).
Classical liberalism injects a potential universalism into the concept of citizenship
by arguing that all individuals are free and equal. Yet the universalism of this
concept is undermined by support for patriarchy, elitism, colonialism – and as
Yeatman has recently reminded us in the case of Locke (see Chapter 8 on Liberalism)- by an acceptance of outright slavery (Yeatman, 1994: 62; Hoffman, 1988: 162).
Locke not only justifies slavery in his Two Treatises, he was a shareholder in a
slave-owning company in Virginia. These rather startling facts coexist with the
liberal notion of free and equal individuals.
Medieval thinkers, like the ancient Greeks, have no universal concept of
citizenship, because although medieval Christians, for example, had a notion of
equality before the Fall, once humans are corrupted by sin (‘the mother of servitude’),
people divide into citizens and slaves, men and women, etc. in the time-honoured
way.
Citizenship and class
The recent literature on citizenship challenges the liberal concept of citizenship on
the grounds that this concept leaves out many categories of people in society. The
argument for a broader franchise was essentially an argument for broadening the
concept of citizenship so that male workers could enjoy political rights.
Classical liberalism assumed that the individual had property, and (as we see in
Chapter 10 on Socialism) some socialists like Eduard Bernstein saw the notion of
citizenship as something that workers could and should aspire to. Marx, on the120 Part 1 Classical ideas