Introduction to Political Theory

the right to petition the Parliament and refer matters to the Ombudsman – are

bestowed on individuals even if they are not members of one of the constituent

nation-states, and are therefore not ‘citizens’. In Heater’s view, the EU is a

sophisticated example of a new kind of citizenship: but ‘at the moment, to be honest,

it is a mere shadow of that potential’ (1999: 129).

The European Ombudsman was introduced in 1992 as a result of Spanish

enthusiasm for EU citizenship and Danish concern for administrative efficiency. The

Ombudsman can deal with a wide range of issues including matters relating to the

environment and human rights. Questions of administrative transparency and the

use of age limits in employment have been pursued vigorously, and the Ombudsman

should not be seen as a ‘stand-alone’ institution, but one which coexists with courts,

tribunals, parliaments and other intermediaries at European, national, regional and

local levels.

It is clearly wrong to think that greater rights for European citizens will happen

automatically. Those who favour this development will need to struggle for it,

arguing that a European identity does not exist in competition with other identities.

On the contrary, European institutions have the potential to add to and reinforce

national and subnational governance, although conflict and dialogue exist between

these levels.

This requires a movement both upwards and downwards – involving more and

more people at every level. The crucial question facing the EU at the moment seems

to us to be the status of residents who are currently excluded from EU citizenship.

Here, as the Bellamy and Warleigh volume argues, a statist ‘nationality’ model

currently prevails, with ethnic migrants being seen as vulnerable ‘subjects’ rather

than as active and entitled members of the EU. Yet, as is pointed out, Article 25,

for example, of the draft Charter of Fundamental Rights does allow residents

who are non-citizens to vote and stand for EU elections (Bellamy and Warleigh,

2001: 198).

Enlargement of the EU poses another set of challenges. The accession of a state

like Turkey can only broaden the cultural horizons of Europeans, and the problem

with Turkey’s admission arises around the question of human rights, not because

the country is predominantly Muslim in its culture. European citizenship, it could

be argued, demonstrates that a citizenship beyond the state is a real possibility.

Does the state undermine citizenship?

Citizenship has been conceived classically as membership of the state. Lister

comments that ‘at its lowest common denominator’ we are talking about the

relationship ‘between individuals and the state’ (1997: 3). Voet likewise takes it for

granted that citizenship is tied to the state (1998: 9). Oommen argues that the term

is meaningless unless it is anchored to the state, so that notions of ‘global’ or ‘world’

citizenship cannot be authentic until we have a world or global state. Thus European

Union citizenship, he insists, will only become a possibility when the union becomes

a multinational federal state (Oommen, 1997: 224). Although Carter is critical of

those who reject cosmopolitanism, she takes it for granted that global citizenship

requires a global state (2001: 168). Marcus Aurelius is cited by Heater as saying

132 Part 1 Classical ideas