(Ignatieff, 1993: 7). The distinction between the two forms of nationalism has been
attributed to Hans Kohn, who, in his discussion of nationalism in the nineteenth
century, defined ‘Western’ nations, such as France, Britain and the United States,
as civic, and ‘Eastern’ nations, such as Germany and Russia, as ethnic.
Civic nationalism appears to be an expression of, or at least compatible with,
the liberal values of freedom (autonomy, choice) and equality (equality of individuals
and equality of nations). The concept of ethnic nationalism is, however, more
complex than Ignatieff suggests. Ethnicity might be understood as a cultural or a
biological concept (or both). Among cultural traits are religion, food, dress, language
and family structures. Biology, on the other hand, in this context is essentially about
genetic relatedness and continuity. Two people can be native speakers of a language
but be genetically very distant from one another (although in fact sharing a language
is highly predictive of genetic closeness). Given the distinction between culture and
biology it is preferable to distinguish two forms of ethnic nationalism – hard and
soft – where the former necessarily entails some notion of genetic relatedness. In
the next section we will focus on soft ethnic nationalism, and its relationship to
liberalism, while in the final section we discuss hard ethnic nationalism.Liberalism and soft ethnic nationalism
Contemporary liberal debates over the status of the nation focus on a number of
distinct questions:- What is the nature of the human person, or ‘self’? Is he or she in some sense
independent of his or her ‘community’ (where one such community is the nation),
or ‘constituted’ by that community? - Does the existence of the nation carry special moral duties to our fellow citizens?
To what extent do such duties limit our freedom? - Does the existence of the nation give us a reason for favouring our compatriots
over others? What are the implications of such ‘partiality’ for the distribution of
resources between nations?
Yael Tamir makes the point that liberals cannot ignore the nation: it forms the
sociological basis of our political life. The world is organised around nations.
Liberals may have problems thinkinglike nationalists but they certainly actlike
nationalists. Nations, Tamir suggests, provide contexts in which people live their
lives. Following Benedict Anderson’s definition, she views the nation as an
‘imaginary community’ (Tamir, 1993: 8). This implies an active capacity to identify:
so, in answer to the first question, a person is (partially) constituted by her
attachments, but in response to the second question the duties entailed in belonging
to a nation are largely self-assumed. This has two practical consequences: individual
choice must be valued, and the right to national self-determination is a right held
by individuals and not by a collective. It is individual Kurds who (should) claim
the right to nationhood rather than an entity called Kurdistan. Kurdistan exists
because it is imagined as a community by individuals identifying themselves as
Kurds. There is, however, a problem of circularity: Kurds identify with Kurdistan
because they believe Kurdistan exists, such that their believing Kurdistan exists does
268 Part 2 Classical ideologies