function of the state is coercively to police territorial boundaries, and for ethnic
nationalists the absence of a territory makes the reproduction of a group’s genes
very difficult.
J. Philippe Rushton claims that nationalism – or ‘ethnic nepotism’ – can be
explained by the ability of individuals to detect genetic closeness, or similarity. He
provides a range of empirical evidence for the general theory of genetic similarity
(Rushton, 1989, 2005), although these claims have been criticised (criticisms are
indicated in the parentheses):
- Sexually interacting couples who produce a child together are more alike
genetically than those who do not. (But ‘mate choice criterion templates’ are
acquired from parents such that men might tend to marry the image of their
mothers (Daly, 1989: 520).) - Non-romantic friends also tend to be similar and similarity is greatest on the
most heritable traits. (Friends may be similar on relatively heritable traits merely
because genotypes systematically seek environments to which they are adapted
(Gangestad, 1989: 525); for example, genes determine height, strength and
stamina and so people with similar genotypes might end up together in a sports
team – they are not selecting each other because of the similarity of their genes
but because of what their genes produce.) - Alcoholics are attracted to alcoholics and there are other similar ‘negative’
features that give rise to attraction. (However, people may settle for similar others
because they have no choice in the mating game and not because they are selecting
the same genes; and if genetic similarity theory is an attempt to explain why like
attracting like is adaptive why would attraction also hold for ‘negative’ traits?
(Economos, 1989: 521).)
As a general point, Rushton has to show, first, that the average degree of
relatedness between mates (and also friends) is higher than it is in the population
as a whole, and, second, choices are made on the basis of genetic similarity. Finding
the right control group (‘population’) is difficult. Proximity could explain mating.
Most people marry people who live – and were born – close by. It follows that the
correct control group should be from a circumscribed – localised – community
(Graves and Byrne, 1989: 527). To test whether we recognise genetic similarity in
others it has to be restricted to times when only unrelated but genetically similar
individuals will be encountered. It is hard to see the circumstances under which this
would happen (Hepper, 1989: 530).
Frank Salter (2002) has drawn on Rushton’s genetic similarity theory in
producing a normative political theory in which nationhood promotes a person’s
‘genetic interests’. There are not distinct races with hard boundaries between them
but there are degrees of genetic closeness. What is particularly interesting about
Salter’s approach is that he takes the gene to be not only the basic unit of inheritance,
but also the primary unit of value. As we mentioned above evolutionary biologists
have debated at what level Darwinian selection takes place, with possible candidates
being the gene, the organism (e.g. individual human beings) or the group (of which
there could be various kinds). Traditional nationalists might be thought to be
concerned exclusively with the group, while liberals think that only the individual
is important. Salter, however, believes our interests lie in the reproduction of our
Chapter 12 Nationalism 273