unilateral declarations of divorce by men; (e) morally indifferent. From the
perspective of respect for secular law, only (b) might raise difficulties – but much
will depend on what penalties are imposed for prohibited acts.- Requirements on women to cover themselves can be interpreted as symbolic –
in the Arab–Islamic world there is huge variation in what is required of women.
Men are also required to be ‘modest’.
Each of these points can be contested, but it is at least plausible to argue that
Muslims can be politicallyliberal. Other citizens – Christians, Jews, Hindus, atheists
and so on – will, of course, produce different lists of reasons for endorsing liberal
principles. The task is not to agree on a set of reasons – reasonable people will
always disagree – but to converge on a set of institutions from diverse standpoints.
348 Part 3 Contemporary ideologies
The four theories discussed above raise a
number of important issues in political theory:- Is cultural diversity intrinsically valuable, or
simply the result of tolerating other belief-
systems and ways of life? A concrete
illustration of the difference between these
two positions can be seen in education
policy: some schools with a culturally diverse
catchment area seek to be inclusive by
getting pupils to celebrate all the major
religious festivals. Here diversity seems to be
valued as an end. On the other hand, many
religions seek to establish or preserve faith
schools; insofar as the state supports such
schools cultural diversity appears here as
toleration. - Should rights be accorded to individuals or
groups? If culture is valuable then treating it
as an individual good may undermine its
integrity. If the rights are held by groups
rather than individuals then there are
significant implications for individual
freedom: a religious group might, for
example, coerce its members into remaining
adherents. Kymlicka argues strongly against
such coercion, but Tully is much less clear
about the ‘rights’ of groups – although he
deliberately avoids using the language of
rights.
3. The various theories raise questions about
the nature of the human person, or self: who
are we? What constitutes our nature? Does it
make sense to talk of the individual (person,
self) as something existing independently of
their culture, or is the individual essentially
constituted by that culture? Kymlicka
stresses independence. Rawls, in the later
work which we discussed above, wants to
avoid any controversial claims about the
nature of the person. Waldron argues for
cultural embeddedness but with ‘fluidity’,
and Tully seems to reject an idea of an
independent, ‘pre-cultural’, self.
4. What are the implications for equality of the
various theories? Critics, such as Brian
Barry, argue that multiculturalism is both a
distraction from the pursuit of traditional
egalitarian policies, and actually undermines
equality (Barry, 2001: 24). Defenders of
multiculturalism, on the other hand, argue for
a ‘difference-sensitive equality’. The
relationship between gender and culture
provides an excellent test case both for the
implications for equality of multiculturalism,
and for the other issues raised above – the
source of value, the status of rights and the
nature of the self – and it is to that
relationship that we now turn.
The argument so far...