emancipatory traditions, the belief in freedom, equality and self-government that
have characterised modern ideas since the Enlightenment. It is important to
emphasise here the tension between form and content. Armstrong argues that
fundamentalisms are ‘essentially modern movements’ that could take root in no
other time than our own. They have absorbed, she says, the pragmatic rationalism
of modernity that enables them to create an ideology that provides a plan of action
(2001: viii, xiii).
How can fundamentalism be both traditionalist and anti-traditionalist, modern
and anti-modern? It is traditionalist in the sense that fundamentalists claim
(although, as it has been argued, such claims need to be taken with a healthy pinch
of salt) to be resurrecting traditions. However, as Giddens notes, the point about
traditions is that you do not have to justify them – they normally contain their own
truth, a ritual truth, asserted as correct by the believer (1994: 6). Fundamentalism
arises in the novel circumstances of global communication (Giddens, 1994: 48),
where traditions are being challenged, and these traditions cannot, it seems, be
effectively defended in the old way. Hence, the context is one of profound anti-
traditionalism. We rather like Roy’s description of Islamism (or what we call Islamic
fundamentalism) as the shariah (the holy book dealing with law) plus electricity
(Roy, 1999: 52), while Armstrong speaks of fundamentalist movements having a
‘symbiotic relationship’ with modernity (Armstrong, 2001: xiii).
The backdrop of fundamentalism is a globalised world in which cross-cultural
communication has not only become possible but also obligatory. Fundamentalism
accentuates the purity of a given set of doctrines, not simply because it wishes to
set them off against other doctrines, but because it rejects the idea of debate and
discussion with people who have different points of view. It is opposed to what
Giddens calls a dialogic engagement of ideas in a public space (1994: 6). While
fundamentalists reject the notion of a ‘changing of places’ essential to dialogue, the
audience is nevertheless global. An imaginary tradition is championed in an
aggressive, dogmatic and polarising way.
There is a curious love/hate relationship to the market. On the one hand, Osama
Bin Laden T-shirts can be seen for sale in shops in Mozambique next to T-shirts
with adverts for the drink ‘Coca-Cola’ emblazoned on them. Suya Mura is a
traditional village in Japan that is publicised for its tourist potential (Giddens, 1994:
86–7). At the same time, fundamentalism Bin Laden-style rages against the
wickedness and corruption of international capitalism. Modern technology, the
Internet and the Wall Street stock exchange are utilised in order to advance
fundamentalist opposition to modernity – that is to liberal values.
Not surprisingly, many of those who challenge modernity are themselves products
par excellence of this modernity. They have been through a secular education often
with a bias towards technical disciplines, and they handle sacred texts in a way that
challenges the conservatism of rabbis, (Muslim) ulemas or priests (Kepel, 1994: 4).
Armstrong makes the point that whereas Westerners tended to see the Ayatollah
Khomeini – the first ruler of Islamic Iran – as a throwback to the Middle Ages,
much of his message and ideology was modern. He described Islam as ‘the religion
of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle
against imperialism’ (Armstrong, 2001: 250, 256; see also Sayyid, 1997: 90). A very
modernist formulation! Gray notes that radical Islamist views resemble European
anarchism far more than they do Islamic orthodoxy (2003: 24, 79).384 Part 3 Contemporary ideologies