universality with absoluteness. A human right is a consideration that must always
be taken into account irrespective of cultural differences, but it does not follow
that a particular human right cannot be overridden. Perhaps some human rights
are absolute, but absoluteness is not a necessary feature of a human right.Relativism versus universalism
So far we have talked about the concept of a right and about the historical origins
of human rights documents and mechanisms of enforcements. What we have not
discussed is the justification of human rights. We assume that the factof law does
not necessarily justifya law. Once we accept this we are forced to confront the
cultural relativism thesis, which can be stated thus:
Values have to be understood as part of a complex whole; that complex whole
is ‘culture’. When discussing the universal applicability of ‘human rights’ we must
take into account the impact that they will have on particular cultures. For some
cultures those rights express central values, for others they may, with some
revision, be compatible with that culture, but for others they may be wholly
inappropriate and damaging.
Cultural relativism does not necessarily entail the rejection of morality: the UDHR
may be valid for certain cultures. What cultural relativists challenge is the claim to
universalapplication. This raises the question whether a relativist can endorse some
form of human rights. One possibility is to distinguish ‘state’ and ‘culture’: the
Council of Europe is composed of 47 states, but it could be argued that there is a
single European culture, which has its roots in Christianity (medieval Europe was
often referred to as ‘Christendom’). Similarly the Islamic world is composed of many
states bound together by Islamic culture (it might also be argued that the Arab
world, as part of the wider Islamic world, is a distinct culture). If we endorse the
separation of state and culture then it might be possible to talk of transnational
standards of treatment. Those standards would allow a distinction to be made
between two ways of rejecting human rights: (a) violationof culturally accepted
human rights by a particular regime; (b) legitimate rejectionof human rights on
cultural grounds. For example, it could be debated whether Saudi Arabian penal
policy, such as public beheadings and the amputation of hands, is grounded in
Islamic teaching and Arab custom, or whether it simply serves the interests of the
Saudi state to have such draconian forms of punishment.
This argument, while plausible, is difficult for a defender of human rights to
embrace. As we suggested in the first section of this chapter, human rights are rights
that individuals have by virtue of their humanity. The cultural argument makes
rights, or any other standard of treatment, contingent on a person’s culture. While
there may be a role for culture in the justification, formulation and implementation
of human rights, the radical ‘culturalism’ that forms the basis of the cultural
relativism thesis is incompatible with a defence of human rights. We need then to
consider arguments against cultural relativism or, put another way, arguments for
universalism. We set out five theories.410 Part 4 Contemporary ideas