protected from external pressure but not at the price of suppressing the freedom of
its adherents to leave. It follows from this that the right to religious freedom must
contain all three elements. Traditionally, in – for example – Muslim countries only
the first element is respected, although it should be said that, historically, Muslims
have shown much greater tolerance of religious minorities, such as Jews and
Christians, than has been the case in Christian Europe with regard to its religious
minorities.
Those who argue that human rights are ‘individualistic’ will not be convinced
by Kymlicka’s understanding of the right to religious freedom as a right held
primarily by the individual. Religion is a collective activity and can only be sustained
as a collective activity, but the individual right to freedom of religion implies
that as individuals we stand back from a religious community and assess its value
for us. It might be, of course, that after reflection we affirm ‘our’ religious belief,
but this implies that only cultures compatible with reflection and revision of
belief are capable of recognising the human right to religious freedom.
Of the five defences provided, Rawls comes closest to rejecting Article 18 on
grounds that a society can be ‘decent’ without being ‘liberal’, and a decent society
would respect the right to practice one’s religion without necessarily permitting
proselytisation. Donnelly is less clear, but suggests that there must be some latitude
in the interpretation of religious freedom. Presumably, a less than clear affirmation
of the ‘good’ of religion and of knowledge would for Finnis be incompatible with
natural right. And Habermas would maintain that freedom of belief and association
is a precondition for discourse. Finally, Rorty’s ironist would not impose any belief
system – including his or her own – as final, and would insist on religious freedom.Summary
The fundamental philosophical debate around human rights is concerned with their
alleged ‘parochialism’: that is, their origins in a particular culture. That something
has a history does not, in itself, invalidate its claim to universality, but there is a
particular problem about human rights even in those cultures from which they
emerged: critics argue that human rights place a great moral weight on individual
autonomy to the detriment of other values, such as welfare and community. For
defenders of human rights, the increasing spread of human rights discourse indicates
a welcome development in humanitarian moral consciousness; for opponents,
human rights go hand in hand with the growing power of Western liberalism.Questions
- Why should states respect human rights?
- If it can be shown that human rights discourse emerges from a Western tradition
does this undermine the claim that they are universal? - Is the exercise of human rights compatible with respect for the environment?
- Is the ‘right to welfare’ coherent?
420 Part 4 Contemporary ideas