Liberalism and the question of violence
We normally define political violence as the use of violence against individuals or
the functionaries of the state. We need to be clear when the use of such violence is
regarded as ‘terrorist’ and when it is not.
Definitions of political violence necessarily contain reference to acts of violence,
and what makes political violence a negative term is that violence itself is seen as
negative. Indeed, it is defined in one recent volume as ‘a type of political depravity
which unfortunately has become commonplace’ (Harmon, 2000: 2). The generalised
opposition to violence comes out of the liberal tradition.
In Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan(1651), there is an emphasis upon avoiding war
and establishing a commonwealth based on consent (see Chapter 8). No covenant
can be valid which exposes a person to ‘Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment’ (1968:
169). Here is the view that force or violence negates freedom, and although Hobbes
allows freedom to be consistent with fear and necessity, it cannot be reconciled with
force. Indeed, so concerned is Hobbes with the problem of force and the individual’s
natural right to avoid it, that (unlike Locke) he takes the view that an individual
is not bound to fight for the state (Hoffman, 1998: 46).
Locke (1632–1704) likewise argues that only when someone is not under the
‘ties of common law of reason’, can ‘force and violence’ be deployed (1924: 125).
It is true that Locke justifies slavery as a state of war continued between a lawful
conqueror and captive (1924: 128), so that even if force can be lawful (a point to
which we will return), the liberal tradition sees a conflict between violence and
freedom, violence and rights.
The notion of political violence only becomes possible when violence is seen in
negative terms. Whereas pre-modern thought regarded violence as a sign of human
empowerment – hence the positive evaluation of the warrior – liberalism argues for
a world in which market exchanges are defined as activity that has banished violence.
Thus the praise for political violence, which is offered by Sheikh Azzam, reputedly
the teacher of the Saudi terrorist Osama Bin Laden, cannot be squared with the
liberal tradition. The notion that political violence is some sort of an obligation in
the Muslim religion is not only a dubious reading of Islam: it implies a legitimacy
for violence which the liberal tradition cannot accept, at least as the criterion of a
free person.
It is true that Hobbes refers to the force of the state as ‘terror’ (1968: 227), but
the use of the term is atypical. It is much more common to refer to the use of force
by the state, and violence used by the enemies of a state who resort to what is seen
as illegitimate violence.The state and political violence
The liberal tradition often distinguishes between force and violence – and thus force
and political violence. State political violence refers to states that sponsor political
violence, not the state per se as an organisation that uses violence.446 Part 4 Contemporary ideas