but Harris’s argument is questionable. For Marx does not regard the exploitation
of labour by capital as violent, and in Capitalhe argues it is the ‘dull compulsion’
of the relations of production that subjects labour to capital. It is not normally
violence or force. The Communist Manifestoargues that when workers destroyed
imported goods, smashed machinery and set factories ablaze, they failed to
understand that it is the relations of production that need to be changed, not the
instruments of production (Marx and Engels, 1967: 89). Random acts of violence
are unhelpful and misguided.
It is true that Marx and Engels in the Address of the Central Authority to the
[Communist] Leaguespeak of the fact that the communists ‘must compel the
democrats to carry out their present terrorist phrases’ encouraging popular revenge
against hated individuals or public buildings (1978: 202), but this was said in the
throes of violent revolution against an autocratic system and cannot be taken as an
endorsement of violence against a liberal state. What makes Marx sceptical about
political violence in general is that it rests upon a belief in an abstract will, not in
the maturation of material conditions. This is why he comments in On the Jewish
Questionthat the belief that private property can be abolished through the guillotine
as in the reign of terror by the Jacobins, is naive and counterproductive (Marx and
Engels, 1975: 156). (The Jacobins were radicals who resorted to political violence
and terror in the later phases of the French Revolution of 1789.)
The problem of violence arises in Marxism from the belief in the inevitability of
revolution. Revolution invariably involves violence and if such violence is directed
against a liberal society, it counts as political violence. Moreover, the idea that the
use of violence is purely tactical and arouses no problem of morality ignores the
difficulty which violence creates in a liberal society.
The Leninist and Maoist position on political violence
In countries like Tsarist Russia (1696–1917), the use of violence against particular
individuals was deemed counterproductive by the Bolsheviks. Indeed, it was labelled
political violence, even terrorism, both by its propagators and critics. What made
such violence harmful was that it did not advance the cause of anti-Tsarism. Thus
the killing of Tsar Alexander II who had come to power in 1881 created, as Laqueur
points out, a backlash and was used to justify more severe policies on behalf of the
regime. In the same way, the upsurge of democratic forces that compelled the Tsarist
government to introduce a new constitution lost its impact when, as a result of
‘terrorist’ attacks in 1906, these concessions were withdrawn.
The problem here is that the attacks on particular figures are premised upon a
flawed analysis of the political process. Many of the terrorists and champions of
political violence, past and present (see Chapter 11 on Anarchism), have been
motivated by an anarchist philosophy which extols abstract willpower, and has
little regard for broadening and deepening a popular movement opposed to a
repressive regime. Marx and Engels condemned the Fenians – the Irish Republican
Brotherhood – in London, not because the two revolutionaries did not sympathise
with the cause of Irish freedom, but because they felt that blowing up people in
Chapter 20 Political violence 453