A general theory of political violence?
Laqueur argues that there will perhaps never be an authoritative guide to political
violence because there is not one political violence, but a variety of political violences
(he equates political violence with terrorism): what is true for one does not
necessarily apply to the others (2003: 8).
Laqueur is certainly right to stress that political violence takes many different
forms. In the nineteenth century political violence was linked to struggles for national
independence and social justice, and sought to avoid civilian casualties. In the
twentieth century, this changed, and the most disturbing feature of what has been
called the ‘new political violence’ is the way in which no distinction is made between
functionaries of a particular regime and ordinary civilians. The IRA tried to give
warnings for its attacks, as does ETA (the Basque Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna) – Al-
Qaeda does not. A clear distinction, therefore, needs to be made between ‘traditional’
political violence that regarded civilian deaths as ‘regrettable’, and the political
violence of groups like Al-Qaeda that specifically targets ordinary people.
While distinctions need to be noted, it has to be said that variety is common to
all movements and ‘isms’. Movements like socialism and concepts like democracy
are also extremely variegated – political violence is no different. Laqueur insists that
political violence ‘more perhaps than most concepts’, has generated widely divergent
interpretations (2003: 232), but there seems to be no reason why this should be so.
Of course, it is complicated by the fact that the term has now (mostly) acquired a
distinctively pejorative tone but concepts like democracy have acquired, as we have
pointed out, a distinctively positive connotation.
While the search for a ‘general theory’ needs to be sensitive to difference and
variety, it is possible to argue the case for a definition of political violence while
stressing the complexity and heterogeneous nature of the phenomenon. When
Laqueur takes the view that ‘the search for a scientific, all-comprehensive definition
is a futile enterprise’ (2003: 238), his problem arises because he assumes that such
a definition must be beyond controversy and counter-argument. An impossible
demand! He in fact goes on to provide a working definition – ‘the systematic use
of murder, injury, and destruction, or the threat of such acts for political ends’. The
use of violence to challenge and remove an authoritarian or explicitly anti-liberal
regime cannot be called terrorism.
Laqueur also argues that what makes a general theory impossible is the fact that
there is not ‘one overall explanation’ of the roots of political violence (2003: 22),
but this argument rests upon a false juxtaposition between the general and the
particular: certainly a theory of political violence is complex and there are many
factors involved. But this is true of all theory. It is a reflection of a complex world,
infinite in its particularity. The general can only express itself through the particular,
and when we come to present our own ‘general theory’, it is clear that multiple
factors are necessarily involved.
It has been argued that, on the one hand, we should ‘perhaps’ think of political
violences rather than political violence, thus freeing ourselves from the tyranny of
the search for an all-embracing and universally acceptable definition. On the other
hand, the term ‘political violence’ is still used in the singular (Gearson, 2002: 22).Chapter 20 Political violence 455